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This study examines and assesses the implications of U.S.
efforts to obtain strategic military access in four Northeast
African states: Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. Accom-
plishment of USCENTCOM's different missions requires access
at various levels to varying degrees. This study establishes
a general hierarchy of access priorities in the six most
critical complexes in the region. Despite U.S. military and
economic assistance programs which are designed to deter
Soviet expansion, increase American influence, and create
regional stability, U.S. access has not been attained. A
concern of American decisionmakers is that increased poli-
tical pressure on the current regimes in Northeast Africa
would be counterproductive to regional stability. For these
reasons, strategic planners must consider alternatives to
access, including elimination of USCENTCOM; reducing its
size and mission; or maintaining the current force structure
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Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on
the vital interest of the United States of America, and
such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force... and in that regard, we are
improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces
rapidly to distant areas. [Ref. 1]
This statement by President Jimmy Carter, which later be-
came known as the Carter Doctrine, led to the creation of
the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) with the mis-
sion to plan for employment of a tailored military force to
meet potential contingencies anywhere in the world. In
January 1983 the RDJTF was redesigned as a unified command
and became the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) with a spe-
cific mission to defend U.S. national or vital interest in
the Middle East.
For the purpose of this study it will be assumed, at
least initially that this mission is both politically and
militarily viable. [Ref. 1: pp. 61-66] However, this
mission cannot be successfully accomplished by military
forces based on the current logistical and operational infra-
structure in the potential area of operations. It is there-
fore determined in this study that facilities in or near the




Since early 1980 the U.S. has sought to gain military
access in or adjacent to the Persian Gulf. The Carter
Administration sought to gain this access in existing
facilities rather than building U.S. owned and operated
bases. Northeast Africa appeared to provide the most geo-
graphically and politically attractive region in which to
locate facilities and attempt to gain access. This study
will assess this decision from an historical perspective
and attempt to assess future possibilities for further U.S.
access in the region. The primary objective of this study
is to assess the requirements for and the implications of
U.S. military strategic access in Northeast Africa.
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
Currently four countries in Northeast Africa, (Egypt,
Sudan, Somalia and Kenya) have been targeted by U.S. defense
planners for acquisitions of facilities for USCENTCOM's use.
Two primary assumptions of this study are that USCENTCOM
required access in the region in order to accomplish its
mission, and that facilities exist in Northeast Africa that
facilitate these requirements. This thesis analyzes the
implications of U.S. access in the region by addressing cur-
rent problems within each country which either enhance or
inhibit U.S. access agreements.
In order to determine the validity of this thesis, the
focussed comparison method of analysis will be used to
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analyze the socio-economic-political situation within the
four case nations and its impact on current or pending
access agreements. The following questions serve as a
guide for the analysis:
1. What is strategic access?
2. What are USCENTCOM's access requirements?
3. What facilities are available in the region?
4. Which of these facilities best meet USCENTCOM's
needs?
5. How are internal and external threats perceived in
the four nations?
6. Do U.S. strategic needs conflict with the domestic
priorities of the potential host country?
7. Does security assistance facilitate the acquisition
of strategic access?
8. What relations exist between current or pending
access agreements, (security assistance programs)
and U.S. strategic access in Northeast Africa?
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION .
Chapter two will examine U.S. foreign policy towards the
Middle East which led to the creation of USCENTCOM. This
examination will entail analyzing the evolution of USCENTCOM,
its mission, its organizational aspects, and the various
types or levels of access needed in Northeast Africa.
Chapter three provides a detailed assessment of those facili-
ties in the region which potentially could enhance
USCENTCOM's mission. Chapter four outlines in detail the
internal and external sources of threat to the four case
13
study nations. Chapter five examines the past and present
relations between the U.S. and Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and
Kenya. The dependability of the current regimes will be
examined to determine if access agreements, once achieved,
can be relied upon. Chapter six will briefly describe
current U.S. military and economic assistance to these
states and relate that aid to the regime's needs and poten-
tial access agreements. Chapter seven examines possible
alternative options to access that defense planners may
consider. Finally, chapter eight will present a summary of
the findings and conclusions of this study, plus recommenda-
tions for future studies concerning the subject of U.S.
military access.
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II. EVOLUTION OF USCENTCOM
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Security of Western interests in the Middle East has
been stressed by every American political leader since
Harry Truman. Since World War II three factors have shaped
U.S. security policy in the Middle East. [Ref. 31 First and
foremost, the growing threat of Soviet expansion and inter-
vention in the region, which briefly caused a shift in the
balance of power and raised the spectre of potential inter-
ference with the flow of oil to the West. Second, has been
our support for Israel and its continuing conflict with the
Arab World. Lastly, is the combination of the geo-political
and economic factors which have led to a confusion of U.S.
policy in the region. This factor illustrates how the U.S.
is affected by the internal political affairs of the region-
al actors, their revolutions, conflicts among themselves,
and their attitudes towards the West. [Ref. 4]
Today the nations of the Middle East find themselves in
the position of a geo-political football in a game played by
the two superpowers. At the same time however, the super-
powers are now more dependent than ever before on internal
political developments in these nations. The mix of these
factors requires all players in the international community
to assess the region in a global perspective while
15
simultaneously considering the regional security factors in
the Middle East.
The second World War brought about major changes in the
international system. Significant power shifts throughout
the world and the growing Soviet military machine posed
threats to American national interest. Washington assumed
the role of the leader of the free world and was compelled
to fill the power vacuums created by the decline of British
and French political influences in the Middle East. Prior
to the war, the United States had expressed little interest
in the region. This fact would haunt American policymakers
for years to come. Few American policymakers were familiar
with the languages, cultures, religions and political de-
sires of the people. This lack of knowledge would exacer-
bate our efforts to formulate foreign policy for the region.
Overall, immediately following WWII the United States 1
image in the Middle East was very favorable. However, as we
became more involved in the Palestinian issue during the
late 1940s this image began to tarnish. U.S. support of a
Jewish state was initially based more on moral issues rather
than on security considerations. In fact officials in the
State and Defense Departments strongly opposed our support
of the establishment of a Jewish state fearing that it would
be detrimental to our economic and security interest in the
region. [Ref. 3: p. 21]
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Our image problems were intensified in 1951 when the U.S
applied diplomatic pressure on Egypt to join the Western-
controlled Middle Eastern Defense Pact designed to counter
potential Soviet threats to the region. The U.S. lack of
understanding of Middle East politics surfaced during this
sequence of events. American policymakers did not have a
thorough understanding of the Arab interests and political
aspirations. Most of the Arabs feared Western imperialism
more than they feared Soviet intervention. In fact, the
Arab world considered Israel to be more of a threat to their
security than the Soviet Union. Little has changed in this
regard.
Containment of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and
around the world has remained the major U.S. security inter-
est since the war. President Truman proclaimed in 1947 that
the United States would "contain" Soviet expansion by any
means necessary. Ambassador George Keenan stated in his
famous "X" Article that: "the main element of any United
States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-
term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian
expansive tendencies." [Ref. 5]
President Eisenhower also viewed the Middle East through
the East-West prism and his foreign policy aims were anti-
Soviet. His administration continued to urge Egypt to join
the Middle East Defense Pact with Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and
Britain in order to seal the Soviets southern boundary.
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President Nasser of Egypt at this point was ideologically
neutral and warned Washington to be patient with his nation
and other Arab nationalist states. But, the United States
continued to apply pressure on the regional actors for a
defense alliance. Again, the lack of foresight and under-
standing of Arab nationalist politics and Arab interests led
to the formulation of the inept and actually harmful Bagdad
Pact of 1955. [Ref. 6] The U.S. applied pressure on the
regional actors to join the alliance. But, congressional
pressures prevented formal ratification and acceptance of
the Pact within the U.S. Bilateral defense agreements were
later signed with some of the Arab and Northern Tier states.
Although American power was theoretically protecting the
Arab World from the Soviets, the new Arab governments did
not want to be linked to this power. This reluctance com-
bined with U.S. miscalculations to drive some of the Arab
states, notably Egypt, into the Soviet camp. In essence the
American "containment" policy failed to thwart Soviet expan-
sion in the Middle East.
During the 50s and 60s the United States continued its
efforts to fill the power gap left by the British evacuation
from the area. Military bases in Turkey, Ethiopia and Iran
were expanded and the U.S. Sixth Fleet was upgraded to meet
its increased security mission. [Ref. 4: p. 5 ] While the
United States was improving its position in the region, the
Soviet Union was also making significant political and
18
military gains in several key Arab states. In retrospect it
is amazing that the Soviets did not take greater advantage
of U.S. foreign policy blunders. However, it is safe to say
that the Soviet diplomatic corps was almost as ineffective
as the American diplomats concerning the Middle East. The
Arab states did not want to establish formal alliances with
any major powers, East or West. [Ref. 7]
Israel added a new dimension to U.S. policies in the
Middle East. In the years between 1948 and 1955, U.S.-
Israeli relations were limited to formal recognition of
Israel as the homeland of world Jewry. This recognition
primarily involved economic assistance to the fledgling
state, while diplomatic relations were cool at best. How-
ever, Israel's attack on Egypt in 1955 prompted a realign-
ment of regional and world powers. President Nasser
requested arms from the U.S., but because of perceived link-
age between Arab nationalism and international communism his
request was denied. Nasser then turned to the Soviet Union
for arms, thereby forcing the U.S. and Israel closer together.
Their relations were solidified between 1955 and 1967 by
regional political activities and a growing Israeli lobby
movement in the American Congress.
The Israeli position became even stronger following the
1967 war. American policymakers determined that Israel was
now a regional military force to be reckoned with. As the
Soviet arms build-up in Egypt intensified from 1967 through
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1971 it appeared that U.S. security interests in the region
were being seriously threatened. In the U.S., both liberals
and conservatives were quick to back Israel. And for the
first time, the United States began to supply Israel with
some of the most advanced weapons in the American arsenal.
The Nixon Doctrine sought to remove the possibility of a
direct super-power confrontation by emphasizing self-defense
by regional powers, with U.S. economic aid and military
assistance. By design the doctrine was a world-wide policy
that happened to have particular applicability to the Middle
East.
Iran and Saudi Arabia, both strongly anti-Soviet nations
possessed a desire and, more importantly, the necessary reve-
nues to increase their military posture. Iran's traditional
enemy, Iraq, was being modernized with Soviet equipment and
Saudi security had been seriously threatened by events in
South Yemen. As Saudi Arabia and Iran assumed the role of
pillars of American interests in the region, the mood of
Congress was one of approval of this approach. Following
Vietnam, U.S. forces were reduced and the American people
did not want to see U.S. involvement in another regional
conflict.
Once again however, the inability of Washington to
correctly "read" Middle East politics led to another foreign
policy debacle in the region. Despite warnings from the
American intelligence community of impending political danger
20
for the Shah, neither Tehran nor Washington were prepared
for the outcome of events in 1979. When the Shah fell in
1979 the United States intensified its support of Saudi
Arabia and included Egypt as a major defender of U.S. inter-
est in the region. Relations between the U.S. and its
moderate Arab allies have been and remain clouded because of
several factors: (1) the U.S. -Israeli relationship; and
(2) Arab fear of American imperialistic motives.
American security interests are invariably linked to the
actions of the key regional actors, both Arab and Israeli.
Stability and security in the region depends on three key
variables: (1) global concerns of the super-powers which
extend to the region, and in a sense are imposed on its
people; (2) related regional policies towards outside powers,
whether based on fear or confidence, economic strength or
need, ideological beliefs or cultural aversions; and (3)
local or regional objectives between the Middle Eastern
states themselves.
B. THE CARTER DOCTRINE AND BEYOND
Like a siege, political instability toward the end of the
1970s laid hold on U.S. interest in the geographic area
extending from Pakistan to the Horn of Africa, often referred
to as the "arc of crisis." Events in this region fostered a
feeling of uncertainty and confusion in Washington which
eventually led to the formulation of the Carter Doctrine.
The rapid decline and fall of the Shah of Iran and the U.S.
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hostage situation alerted the White House policymakers that
the Nixon Doctrine and detente were dead issues. After the
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Carter informed the
Kremlin that further advances in the Gulf would provoke a
United States military response.
Regardless of the Soviet Union's rationale for the inva-
sion of Afghanistan, (the Kremlin's official explanation was
that it was requested by the People's Democratic Party) the
Carter Doctrine was partially based on the belief that
Moscow's objective was to gain control of the Persian Gulf
and its oil resources. [Ref. 8] Carter's more hawkish
advisors, including National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski, had been pushing for a firmer policy regarding
Soviet adventurism since the events in the Horn of Africa in
1977 and 1978. Following the Afghan invasion, it became
increasingly clear to Carter that detente had expired and
that a return to the policy of military containment of the
Soviets was necessary. The Soviet invasion also required
Carter to reaffirm our commitment to protect our Northern
Tier allies, in particular Pakistan.
Ralph H. Magnus points out that Soviet actions were per-
ceived as offensive efforts aimed at the control of Middle
Eastern oil and a reduction of American prestige. As a
result of events in Iran the Carter Doctrine was molded
along military parameters, and since the pronouncement of
this doctrine, U.S. foreign policy has assumed a more
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militant posture. As the Rapid Deployment Force was becom-
ing a reality, other events occurred which signified an
increased U.S. military role in the region: arms sales to
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were increased; the U.S. Sixth
Fleet in the Mediterranean was expanded; facilities at Diego
Garcia were improved; and access to ports in Somalia, Kenya
and in Oman were obtained. U.S. efforts to normalize rela-
tions with key Arab states were exacerbated by the on-going
Arab-Israel problems and the linkage of U.S. /Israeli eco-
nomic and military assistance.
The U.S. build-ups in the region were countered by
Soviet improvements at its bases in Aden and the capabili-
ties of its Indian Ocean Fleet. These actions, both Soviet
and American, have contributed to the regional instability
and have placed the region into a geo-strategic context.
As promised during the presidential campaign in 1980,
the Reagan Administration came into office with the anti-
Soviet rhetorical guns blazing. Reagan's concept of securi-
ty in the Middle East was based on the theory of containing
Soviet expansion. The President proclaimed that a strong
military presence in the region would serve as a deterrent
to further Soviet actions in the Gulf and the Middle East.
Strategic consensus was the basic concept for contain-
ment of the Soviets during the first two years of the Reagan
Administration. This policy stated that key regional actors
would protect our interest in exchange for economic and
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military assistance. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and in
particular Israel were chosen to become the new "pillars" of
the American Security Program in the Middle East.
It is very apparent that Reagan's policy responses are
militant in nature. The Marine contingency at the airport
in Beirut and the naval support vessels off the coast are
examples of Reagan's willingness to use military forces as
instruments of foreign policy.
The current national interest of the U.S. regarding the
Middle East, as outlined by Nicholas A. Veloites, the then
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
are consistent with traditional American views for the
region. They include:
1. To preserve a global strategic balance which will
permit free and independent societies to pursue their
aspirations.
2. To assure the security and welfare of the state of
Israel and other important friendly nations in the region.
3. To check the spread of Soviet influence in this
strategic region and, by extension, elsewhere in the world.
4. To preserve and foster our critical interest in
continued access to the region's oil.
5. To fill the inescapable responsibility of the United
States to work for the resolution of conflicts in the region
which threaten international security and the well-being of
the countries and people of the region. [Ref. 9]
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Mr. Veliotes' testimony clearly reflects the current
Reagan Administration's perspectives on the Middle East.
U.S. foreign policy is based on the containment strategy.
The Soviet Union and its proxies provide the greatest threat
to western interest. Accordingly, Reagan's strategies focus
on a build-up of American military forces for projection or
for intervention purposes. Now let us discuss the specific
military organization designed for use in the defense of
U.S. interest in the Middle East, USCENTCOM.
C. THE UNITED. STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
USCENTCOM is a result of a three phase Carter Administra-
tion plan which was formulated following the 1980 State of
the Union Address. The Carter Doctrine set into motion the
actual formation of a Rapid Deployment Force. However, the
concept of a RDF had been on the Pentagon drawing boards
since 1977. U.S. planners had determined that a four ser-
vice force, capable of rapid deployment to areas outside
Korea and NATO, was needed to deter Soviet expansion around
the world.
Phase one of the Carter Plan called for initiatives that
would increase the speed and mobility of U.S. forces which
could be deployed around the world, and in particular the
Middle East. This would require a vast expansion of the
strategic airlift and sealift capabilities in addition to
establishing a stockpile of equipment for a full Marine
Division.
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The second phase called for the establishment of a U.S.
force structure to be identified as under the operational
control of a separate task force commander. On 1 March
1980, the headquarters of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force was established as a subordinate element of the U.S.
Readiness Command.
Phase three involved diplomatic efforts to gain access
rights for U.S. forces in various Middle Eastern nations.
Forward staging at various facilities in or near the area of
operation was deemed critical to the planning of military
intervention operations in the region.
Prior to further discussion of USCENTCOM in its present
state, it is worthwhile to digress briefly and re-state that
the concept of a rapidly deployable force is not new. Going
back to the early 1960s the Kennedy Administration perceived
the need for a force that could strike anywhere in the world
except Korea and in Europe utilizing, naval, marine and air-
borne forces stationed in the continental United States
(CONUS) . In 1962 the U.S. strike command was created, pri-
marily consisting of U.S. Army units that were CONUS based
and could deploy to trouble spots around the globe. [Ref. 1:
pp. 4-5] Deployability was predicated on the procurement of
new strategic transport aircraft, the C-5A, and a new sealift
vessel, the Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ships, which was
never approved by Congress.
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The Vietnam war created several major problems for the
strike command. First, assets (units) earmarked for its
mission were diverted to Southeast Asia, for example, the
101st Airborne Division and the 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Air-
borne Division. Secondly, Congress resisted apparently
fearing that' the maintenance of such assets and organiza-
tional capabilities would make it much easier to justify
another intervention. During the immediate post-Vietnam
era, the chances of a U.S. military intervention in areas
other than Korea or Europe were extremely remote, primarily
because of domestic political constraints. These con-
straints, especially adverse public opinion, produced a
quasi neo-isolationist attitude which forced a reduction of
the procurement process of all U.S. military forces.
The strike command was replaced in 1972 by the U.S.
Readiness Command (REDCOM) which was still targeted at the
global level. Between 1972, and the formation of the RDF in
1980, the Middle East was under the jurisdiction of the U.S.
European Command (EUCOM) Headquarters in West Germany. Soon
after Jimmy Carter took office he issued presidential direc-
tive (PD) 18 which became the basic planning document for
the creation of a "quick-reaction" force. Initially there
was little budgetary support for the plan. However, events
in Iran and Afghanistan during the late 1970s prompted a
realignment of fiscal considerations previously centering on
NATO ground and air forces, to support the establishment of
USCENTCOM as it is today. [Ref. 1: p. 46]
27
D. USCENTCOM'S MISSION AND ORDER OF BATTLE
U.S. Marine General Paul X. Kelley, the current Marine
Corps Commandant, was designated as the first commander of
the RDJTF in 1980. General Kelley stated the mission of the
RDJTF was
To plan for the employment of designated forces, to
jointly train and exercise them, and to ultimately
deploy them in response to contingencies threatening
U.S. interest anywhere in the world, in essence, to
provide the essential command and control that will
bring together in a synergistic way, the capabilities
of our four services. [Ref. 10]
It should be explained that a task force is a normal mili-
tary organization tailored for a specific mission and has a
specific chain of command for reporting purposes. The RDJTF
reported through the Joint Chiefs of Staff directly to the
Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 10: p. 622] The importance of
this fact lies in the uniqueness of a separate operational
Task Force Commander having direct access to the executive
branch with the service chiefs as intermediaries. This
relationship exemplified the importance of the RDJTF mission
as viewed by the Carter Administration. It is important to
remember that the RDJTF was not originally targeted at a
particular regional area.
USCENTCOM was established on 1 January 1983 and, unlike
the RDJTF, it assumed responsibility for a clearly-defined
geographic area covering the Middle East to include the
Persian Gulf states, the Horn of Africa, and the Northern
Indian Ocean region. USCENTCOM' s role is not unique among
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U.S. military commands. However, the political diversity of
the region makes the command's responsibilities complex at
best. USCENTCOM's primary mission is to protect the securi-
ty interest of the U.S., our Western allies, and key
regional actors by projecting a credible military deterrent
to potential threats, particularly the Soviets. It is
designed to maintain security and sovereignty of independent
states is protected.
USCENTCOM planners have proposed three levels from which
they would operate in the event of an external or internal
threat to the region: (1) Assist the indigenous military
forces of a friendly state to the maximum extent possible,
(2) Provide assistance for the threatened nation and its
allies in the region, and (3) Introduce CONUS-based U.S.
ground, air or naval forces in the area to support the
threatened state. [Ref. 10: p. 624] It is clearly stated
that support at any of these levels must be formally re-
quested by the threatened nation.
As already mentioned, the actual deployment force would
be tailored to meet the threats for a particular contingency.
A full deployment force could involve almost 300,000 person-
nel, and more if required. Table one indicates units that
have been designated to be under the operational control
(OPCON)of USCENTCOM in the event of a real-world contingency.
It should be noted that the list is not all-inclusive due to
the classification of the actual troop list.
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TABLE 1
USCENTCOM ORDER OF BATTLE
USCENTCOM HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
HQ 3rd Army
HQ XVIII Airborne Division
82nd Airborne Division
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
24th Infantry Division (Mech)
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)
1st Support Command
U.S. AIR FORCE CENTRAL COMMAND
HQ 9th Air Force
Seven Tactical Air Wings:
1st TFW (F-15) , 27th TFW (F-lll , 347th TFW (F-4)
345th TFW (A-10) , 366th TFW (F-lll), 121st TFW Air
National Guard (A-7) , and one more to be designated.
Four tactical Fighter Groups: 150th TFG Air National
Guard (a-7), and three more to be designated.
One Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-4G Wild Weasels)
522nd Airborne Warning and Control Wing (E-3A AWACS)
One Tactical Reconnaissance Group (RF-4C)
One Electronic Combat Group (EC-130H)
1st Special Operations Wing (MC-130E, AC-130H, NS HH-53H)
Various Special Operations and Unconventional Forces
U.S. NAVAL CENTRAL .COMMAND
HQ U.S. Navy Command
Three Aircraft Carriers
Battle Group, Each Carrier Possessing One Air Wing
With Between 85 and 95 additional Aircraft. (These are
drawn from 6th and 7th Fleets)
*These Carrier Battle Groups are tailored but normally
are supported by its Surface and Sub-Surface Defense
Force.
Three Amphibious Ready Groups
Five Maritime Patrol Squadrons
The U.S. Middle East Force
U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES
One Marine Amphibious including:
One Marine Division (Reinforced)
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One Marine Aircraft Wing
One Force Service Support Group
7th Marine Amphibious Brigade, including:
One Marine Regiment (Reinforced)
One Marine Air Group
*Source : Andrew J. Ambrose, U.S. Central Command




Following the events in Iran and Afghanistan, the
Pentagon discovered that the Middle East was without an
operational or logistical infrastructure from which military
operations could be conducted. President Carter sought to
utilize existing facilities in the region rather than build-
ing and maintaining U,S. owned bases. Timing was important
as was the necessity of maintaining a low profile in the
politically sensitive Middle East.
But what were USCENTCOM' s logistical access needs? What
facilities in Northeast Africa could be made available to
enhance USCENTCOM' s chances of success? These questions
will be addressed in the next chapter.
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III. NEED FOR ACCESS
It is apparent that a force the size of USCENTCOM re-
quires a vast logistical apparatus to support itself in
sustained combat. Currently the U.S. military force' struc-
ture does not possess the means to interject the type and
amounts of equipment and supplies required to accomplish
this mission.
The Carter Administration made the decision in early
1980 to attempt to gain access to key military and civilian
facilities both inside and outside the target area. Carter
wanted to utilize existing facilities in lieu of building
U.S. owned bases in the region or building a massive trans-
port fleet. Northeast Africa provided what appeared to be
the most favorable politico-military and geographical area
to seek strategic access. [Ref. 11]
A. HIERARCHY OF ACCESS
Before we establish a rank order or hierarchy of access
we must answer a very basic, but important question, namely
what is strategic access? Webster defines strategic as:
necessary or important in the initiation, conduct or comple-
tion of a strategic plan; required for the conduct of war.
Webster defines access as: permission, liberty to enter;
freedom or ability to obtain or make use of. [Ref. 12]
While access may entail various types of military and
33
civilian connotations, for our purposes the term will be
limited to the military context. To further amplify the
terminology used in this study, it is important to draw a
distinction between "bases" and "facilities." A facility
refers to a complex where the host nation controls or limits
the guest's use of an installation. Bases on the other hand
refer to a user's exclusive control gained via treaties or
under compulsion. Geopolitics within the past twenty years
have rendered the latter almost obsolete. This study then
will refer to USCENTCOM's access rights to facilities in the
region. [Ref. 13]
For the successful accomplishment of USCENTCOM's mission,
given current force structure limitations, strategic access
in Northeast Africa is critical. Without a logistical system
from which to operate, the feasibility and viability of the
organization's mission is reduced drastically. For our pur-
poses then, we must consider strategic access as the lifeline
of current USCENTCOM doctrine.
Another key question is, what type of access do we seek
in the region? Listed below are the various types of access
as they apply to Northeast Africa. These types of access
vary in the military importance as well as in the political
complexities.
Our first level of access represents and best illustrates
the political sensitivity of the access issue. This type of
access involves the stationing of U.S. troops, aircraft or
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naval vessel on a semi-permanent or ad hoc basis [Ref. 14].
Factions within the potential host countries have expressed
concern that an increased U.S. military presence threatens
their sovereignty and external relations. U.S. defense
planners have stated that the prepositioning of war stocks,
(fuel, ammunitions, spare parts, oil, water and support
equipment) are critical to USCENTCOM's mission. This level
of access also includes the use of airfields and ports for
intra-theatre combat operations as well as resupply
operations.
A separate, yet closely linked sub-level of this type of
access also exists. This second level allows U.S. forces
the use of airfields and port facilities for various types
of repairs, refueling operations, crew recreation, or purely
short term "flag waving" activities [Ref. 14: p. 12] The
exact parameters for this type of access may or may not be
formalized until a specific need arises.
A third level of access centers around short term train-
ing activities [Ref. 14: p. 11] . Often, as in the "Bright
Star" operations, this type of access may be co-sponsored by
the host nation (for example, Egypt) and the U.S. In the
case of the "Bright Star 82" exercise, multiple nations bene-
fited from these endeavors. For example Somalia, which was
only a low-level player, received technical and economic
assistance for the upgrading of the air facilities at
Berbera. U.S. Commanders and staff benefited by gaining
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first hand experience in dealing with the problems of desert
warfare under realistic conditions.
A fourth type of access focuses on the more technical
aspects of strategic access. These functions are related to
advanced communications systems, intelligence collections
and deep threat surveillance. It may cover an entire spec-
trum of national systems, from satellite tracking stations,
JCS command and control communications systems to underwater
submarine detection systems. [Ref. 14: p. 14] This type of
access is critical, however classification of sources pre-
vents a more detailed discussion.
The last level of access that is important for USCENTCOM
is that of overflight rights. Overflight privileges are
traditionally harder to control or scrutinize therefore are
often much more flexible. [Ref. 14: p. 13] Currently all
four of the nations in this study have agreed to grant U.S.
military forces overflight privileges without restrictions.
If another Arab-Israeli conflict broke out, Egypt and Sudan
would more than likely revoke this agreement with the U.S.,
assuming that the U.S. would support Israel as it did in
1973.
The typology below provides a summarized view of the
levels of access:
Level One : Semi-permanent Access
1. Allows temporary stationing of troops and or
support personnel.
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2. Allows for storage or prepositioning of combat equip-
ment, aircraft and naval vessels.
3. Prepositioning of fuel, oil, ammunition, water and
spare parts
.
4. Allows for the prepositioning of support equipment,
e.g. fuel trucks, administrative vehicles and cargo handling
equipment
.
Level Two : Limited Access
1. Temporary use of Airfields and Port facilities for
refueling and minor repairs.
2. Diplomatic visits or "show the flag" type visits.
3. Recreational crew visits.
Level Three: Training Activities
1. Unilateral, bilateral or multilateral training
exercises
2. Temporary stationing of troops and technicians for
training purposes.
Level Four : Technical Facility Access
Allows for the establishment of technical facilities
with specific communications, intelligence or surveillance
functions
Level Five : Overflight Rights
Grants unhindered access to host nation's air space for
normal or routine military flight operations.
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B. SURVEY OF FACILITIES
This chapter provides an analysis of the existing
facilities in the region which can service USCENTCOM. The
methodology of the survey includes a brief description of
the features which make these facilities attractive or un-
attractive to defense planners. Key ports, airfields, and
internal transportation systems will be identified in each
country that could enhance USCENTCOM 's mission. At the con-
clusion of this chapter a rank order of key facilities will
be provided. This typology will prove helpful for our anal-
ysis of the U.S.'s willingness to provide military assis-
tance packages in exchange for access agreements.
1 . Egyptian Facilities
Within -Egypt four strategic complexes have been
identified for potential use by U.S. forces. The Port of
Alexandria because of it's size and location on the
Mediterranean, the Cairo West and East air facilities, Port
Said at the northern mouth of the Suez, and Ras Banas, an
austere but strategically located facility on the Red Sea.
a. Alexandria
Alexandria is Egypt's largest and most impor-
tant port city. It's location on the Mediterranean makes
it a strategically valuable port as well as a potential
liability. Alexandria is capable of supporting all classes
of naval vessels and is equipped with relatively advanced
navigational and cargo handling equipment. [Ref. 15]
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However, internal and external lines of communications to
and from the city are outdated and antiquated. Alexandria
does possessan airfield that is C-130 capable but support
facilities are limited.
b. Port Said
Port Said is strategically located at the south
of the Suez Canal, making it a critical control point on the
shipping lines of communications (SLOC) . It consists of a
large harbor, with fair to good covered and uncovered shel-
ters for cargo storage. The canal/harbor is capable of
handling large classes of ships to include aircraft car-
riers. Information concerning the airfield at Port Said
was not available. Again, it's location and capabilities
make Port Said a valuable asset as well as a potential
target.
c. Cairo West and East
Cairo's major contribution to USCENTCOM centers
around the airfields near the city. Cairo has the only
airports in Egypt that are fully capable of supporting large
U.S. military transport aircraft (C-141 and C-5). [Ref. 16]
This inter-theatre and intra-theatre capability makes
Cairo's air facilities vital to U.S. defense planners.
Support facilities and navigational data (supplied and con-
firmed during the Bright Star exercises) make Cairo a logi-
cal and desirable position from which to operate on a long
term basis or to provide a jump-off point for operations
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directly in the Persian Gulf. But, Cairo's air facilities
are vulnerable to terrorist activities.
d. Ras Banas
Ras Banas is located on the Red Sea near Saudi
Arabia and is clearly the most important military complex
in Egypt. In spite of this claim, it- is important to state
that the facilities are good, but not excellent. The port
will facilitate large ships and it's cargo handling capa-
bility ranges from fair to good. Support and storage faci-
lities at the port are limited. The airfield is currently
C-130 capable, with fair to poor ground support and naviga-
tional systems.
In light of the relatively austere and under-
developed state of these facilities, one may ask why Ras
Banas has been deemed so important. By referring to
figures 1 and 2 the answer should become more evident. Ras
Banas is centrally located and could serve a dual role as an
inter and intra-theatre sea and air weigh station into the
Persian Gulf. With substantial upgrading of its facilities,
men and material could be transported into Ras Banas via
C-5/C-141 or major sea transport vessels, transferred to
intra-theatre aircraft and be quickly put into combat.
[Ref. 17]
2 . Sudanese Facilities
Sudan possesses what USCENTCOM would consider two
major and three minor or secondary strategic facilities or
42
complexes. Khartoum, the national capital and largest
population center, and Port Sudan, the country's only deep
water port are considered the two primary complexes for use
by USCENTCOM. The secondary complexes located at Juba,
Atbarah and East Central Sudan, are more important in an
internal-domestic context, but could have a limited strate-
gic role.
a. Khartoum
Khartoum, located on the Nile River is actually
comprised of three suburbs: Khartoum, North Khartoum, and
Omdurman. It is the educational, cultural and administra-
tive center of the country. Road networks within the city
are adequate with four lane routes connecting the primary
air and Nile port faciltiies.
Two airfields, Khartoum International and Wadi
Seinda, located 15 km north of Omdurman are capable of
supporting C-130 and C-141 aircraft. Khartoum International
possesses sophisticated air control equipment and ground
support equipment to handle heavy cargo loads. [Ref. 18]
Wadi Seinda 's facilities are less refined, but still impor-
tant. Weather and geographic conditions are generally
favorable all year round. Transportation by rail and road
from Khartoum to Port Sudan is generally good for movement
of personnel or supplies. Limitations and vulnerabilities
do exist however, for example, the rail and road systems




terrorist activities. Moreover, Khartoum's potable water
supply, hydroelectric stations, and fuel storage facilities
are also vulnerable targets for terrorists.
b. Port Sudan
Port Sudan is the only deep water port in Sudan
and it also possesses the majority of the country's petro-
leum storage facilities. Internal road networks are good
to fair. As previously mentioned, Port Sudan is connected
with Khartoum via rail and road, but to few other cities.
The port facilities are small and marginally
adequate for military use. Although the cargo handling
capacity is limited, it could support U.S. naval needs. No
major ship repair facilities exist, however minor repairs
can be accomplished on a routine basis. [Ref. 18: pp. 185—
186] Port Sudan's internal and external lines of communica-
tions (rail and road) are vulnerable to terrorist activities.
Also, the city's piped-in water supply, massive petroleum
storage facilities and power plants are also vulnerable.
c. Secondary Complexes
Juba: Located in southern Sudan, this city is
the focal point of the internal dissidence for the central
government. Juba ' s airfield is C-130 capable, but lacks
any support facilities. The city is the port terminal for
the White Nile river complex. Possibly its most important
feature is its proximity and road linkage with the port in
Mombasa, Kenya and Nairobi.
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Atbarah: Atbarah is critical to the agricul-
tural sector of Sudan and to the Sudanese rail system. Its
small airfield is of little military value. The city's
importance is primarily domestic in nature.
East Central Sudan: This area contains a ma-
jority of Sudan's agricultural production. It is located
on the major lines of communication between Khartoum and
Port Sudan therefore making it critical to intra-country
movement.
3 . Somali Facilities
Although vast improvements have been made in the
past twenty years, Somalia remains a poorly developed
country. Few all-weather roads link the major cities and
the country totally lacks any type of rail system. Despite
this weakness, Somalia does possess two major and two
minor facilities that could be utilized by U.S. forces.
Berbera, located on the Gulf of Aden in northern Somalia,
and Mogadishu, the national capital, are the major air and
deep water complexes. Secondary facilities at Chisimayu
and Hargeisa could be used for intra-theatre/country
operations.
a. Berbera
Berbera 's location, rather than its facilities
make the port city valuable to USCENTCOM. From its port
and air facilities U.S. forces can operate close to the Bab




with capabilities for handling large military and civilian
ships. Repair capabilities do exist, as does fuel handling
equipment, albeit in a state of much needed repair. [Ref.
15: p. 181] Cargo storage and handling capabilities are
adequate. Roads and transportation systems within the city
are marginal. Air facilities near Berbera can accommodate
C-141 and C-5 aircraft, but currently are in poor condition.
Berbera ' s airfields are under military control and lack any
type of advanced air control equipment. Weather and topo-
graphic considerations are not a problem. Berbera 's other
limitations and vulnerabilities include: (1) its proximity
serves as a disadvantage as well as an advantage in the
event of an attack from either South Yemen or Ethiopia;
(2) the internal infrastructure in Berbera is very weak;
and (3) water supplies, electric power stations and communi-
cations facilities are vulnerable to terrorist activities,
b. Mogadishu
Mogadishu is the key political, military and
industrial city in Somalia. It is serviced by two all
weather roads, one north to Belet Uen and one west to Ag
Foi and by international shipping and air lines.
Mogadishu's port is primarily commercial in nature, however
it can service a military force if required. The inter-
national airfield can support all U.S. transport aircraft.
[Ref. 19] It does not possess sophisticated aircraft con-
trol equipment nor advanced ground support equipment.
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Mogadishu's vulnerabilities are similar to Berbera's with
one exception. Because of its location and critical eco-
nomic, military and government role, the city would provide
a much more lucrative target for air and sea attacks.
c. Secondary Complexes
Chisimayu: This southern city .possesses a
lesser developed port facility. It also has an airfield
that is capable of handling C-141s, but lacks any ground
support facilities.
Hargeisa: This is a regionally important mili-
tary and economic complex. Its location near the Ethiopian
border makes it a key defensive site as well as a vulnerable
target. Hargeisa International Airport is C-130 capable,
but does not have any ground support capability.
4 . Kenyan Facilities
Two principal complexes exist in Kenya which could
support USCENTCOM. Nairobi, the capital and largest city is
Kenya's most economically important city, while Mombasa, the
country's major port city, has the most strategic value.
a. Mombasa
Mombasa is the country's only major inter-
national port and serves not only Kenya but other regional
states. It is linked to Nairobi by a relatively high
quality rail and road system. Storage areas, cargo handling
and ship repair capabilities are of extremely good quality.
Ships of all sizes are capable of accessing the harbor with-









































Mombasa also possesses an airfield that is C-141
capable. The runway conditions are good, however cargo and
fuel handling equipment is limited. Air access routes from
the east and north are unrestricted. Mombasa's primary limi-
tation is that it is the most distant of all facilities sur-
veyed from USCENTCOM's target area. Also, the harbor complex
is particularly vulnerable to sea denial operations,
b. Nairobi
Although more commercially important than
Mombasa, Nairobi is less strategically important. Its major
contributing factor is that Nairobi International Airport is
capable of supporting C-5s, while Nairobi/Eastleigh and
Nairobi/Wilson airfields are C-130 capable. Nairobi Inter-
national possesses the latest navigational and electronic
air control equipment in East Africa. Fuel and cargo hand-
ling capabilities are good. Again, air access routes and
weather conditions are favorable all year round.
C. PRIORITY OF RANK ORDER OF ACCESS
Of the sixteen complexes surveyed in the last section
only six could be considerd desirable or critical to
USCENTCOM. In presenting a rank order of these facilities
we risk the danger of providing a false image. An actual
rank order may or may not exist at USCENTCOM headquarters.
Clearly however each of the six complexes listed below do
possess a set of qualities which make them strategically
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important to USCENTCOM. These qualities, listed below in
terms of advantages and disadvantages, either enhance or
exacerbate USCENTCOM 1 s ability to accomplish its mission.
It must also be clear that a degree of duplicity or
redundancy in the logistical and operational systems must
exist. This requires access in several different facilities
simultaneously, often with duplicate functions. This rank
order will further facilitate our analysis in determining if
a relationship exists between U.S. needs and the military




a. Proximity to the possible target area.
b. With an upgrading of the facilities, Ras
Banas could support both intra and inter theatre operations.
Disadvantages:
a. Currently unable to reach an access agree-
ment with the Egyptian government due to Arab pressures.
b. Sea access routes are subject to closure of
the Suez Canal and the Bab El Mandeb Straits.





a. Proximity to the target area makes logisti-
cal and limited combat operations possible.
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b. Port and airfield facilities require limited
but necessary repairs.
c. Barre government seeks U.S. presence.
Disadvantages
:
a. Proximity to the Gulf of Aden and Ethiopia
makes U.S. forces vulnerable to air and sea attacks.
b. Instability of the Barre regime makes agree-
ments tenuous at best.
3. Mogadushu
Advantages :
a. U.S. forces still enjoy quick access into
the possible area of operation.
b. Barre support of U.S. presence.
Disadvantages
a. Instability of the Barre regime.







a. Current support of the host government for
U.S. presence.
b. Limited construction would be required.
Disadvantages
a. The harbor complex is vulnerable to denial
operations.




Cairo East and West
Advantages
:
a. Availability of advanced air facilities and
accurate navigational data.
b. Existence of an experience data base within
U.S. and Egyptian military forces gained during join opera-
tions in recent years.
Disadvantages
:







a. Proximity to the area of operations.
b. Current support of the host nation govern-
ment for U.S. presence.
Disadvantages
a. Instability of the Numeri government may be
exacerbated by a U.S. presence.
D. SUMMARY
As presented in the data above, Northeast Africa does
possess several military and civilian air and port facili-
ties which would enhance the USCENTCOM mission. In order to
accomplish its mission successfully, given the current force
structure, USCENTCOM would require access at various levels
and in more than one country simultaneously.
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Row have the four case study nations responded to U.S.
requests for access? What variables must these governments
consider when negotiating with the U.S. for access? These
questions will be addressed in the next chapter.
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IV. RESPONSE TO ACCESS
This chapter looks at the issue of U.S. access in North-
east Africa from the perspective of the regional actors.
More specifically it attempts to analyze the situation on
the ground within each of the four African nations to assess
their perceptions of internal and external threats. This
analysis will provide a listing of the domestic priorities
facing the leadership in the region.
A. THREAT PERCEPTIONS
Instability in the Middle East and Africa is neither new
nor uncommon. Within Northeast Africa in recent years
coups, food riots, civil wars, inter-state conflicts and
economic difficulties have become more the norm than the
exception. It is with this in mind that we must attempt to
analyze the threats facing the current governments in the
region. These threats, both internal and external, real or
imagined, must be considered because of their eventual im-
pact of the assistance programs and the question of access.
The external threats are often confusing and difficult
to verify. U.S. policymakers are often forced to make deci-
sions without the benefit of validated intelligence reports.
Washington must understand as fully as possible the sources
of external threats in the region when considering military
assistance packages.
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internal threats in this region may be of greater conse-
quence when considering military and economic assistance
programs. In order to analyze these threats a quantitative
analysis of internal strife has been undertaken based on the
following factors: economic, political; religious or ethnic
factionalism; nationalistic or separatist movements; resis-
tance to economic or political dependence on foreign powers;
and lack of educational opportunities. [Ref. 20]
The time-frame for this analysis is from 1980 (following
the pronouncement of the Carter Doctrine) to the present.
Most of the conditions that exist in these states are per-
sistent and are not short-term in nature. In other words,
the problems or conditions creating instability within these
nations have deep roots dating much earlier than 1980.
B. EGYPT
Since the death of Anwar Sadat in October 1981, "
President Hosni Mubarak has actively sought ways to reduce
the sources of threats to Egypt. Traditionally, Egypt's
foreign policy clearly reflected the impact of its domestic
factors. To an even greater degree this remains true today.
However, Mubarak seems more politically pragmatic than
either Nasser or Sadat.
Nasser emphasized Egypt's role in the international
community as a third world power stressing Egyptian
nationalism. Sadat initially followed Nasser's
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nationalist programs, but after the 1973 war he switched
alliances from the Soviets to the U.S. and sought peace
with Israel. This decision cost him the isolation of Egypt
from the rest of the Arab world and contributed to the
growth of internal opposition. Both Nasser and Sadat
failed to accomplish what was most needed in Egypt: inter-
nal economic development. This has traditionally been, and
remains, a major source of instability.
1. Internal Threats
Two diametrically opposing factors have severely
impacted on the Egyptian economy during the past twenty
years, namely two major wars with Israel, and the subse-
quent periods of peace following these wars.
Sadat's "open door" policy called for an increase
in foreign investments and various types of western eco-
nomic aid. This aid has become the mainstay of the
Egyptian economy. Prior to Camp David, the oil rich Arab
states were the primary sources of aid and investments
(reportedly between $1.7 and $2 billion by 1977). [Ref.
21] By signing the peace treaty with Israel, Sadat risked,
and in fact lost, most forms of Arab economic assistance.
Jimmy Carter proposed that the U.S. should fill the void as
a reward for Camp David.
This produced another source of internal conflict,
fears of economic dependency on a superpower. Arabs
traditionally have feared and opposed the presence or
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involvement of a major power in their internal affairs.
This anti-imperialist attitude has transcended into current
Egyptian political attitudes. Moderate and radical Arabs
have strongly opposed U.S. economic and military aid for
Egypt as an exchange for peace with Israel.
Internal resistance to U.S. assistance is closely
linked with the larger issue of economic underdevelopment.
In spite of President Mubarak's Five Year economic program,
little progress has been made. Factors such as the oil
glut, the world-wide recession, and the effects of Sadat's
assassination on tourism have had a tremendously detrimen-
tal affect on Egypt's economic growth.
Egypt's internal political threats are inextri-
cably linked to other sources of internal threats. Al-
though four major political parties are recognized, the
National Democratic Party (NDP) is clearly in control. This
lack of a representative opposition has bred political un-
rest. [Ref. 22] Mubarak has attempted to establish a dia-
logue with the opposition leaders, indicating that he is
willing to work with differing political interests in Egypt.
This does not imply that a massive political transition has
occurred or is programed in the future. The NDP and
Mubarak have maintained a tight rein on the two factions
that are the greatest threat to the government, radical
Muslims and the military. Mubarak regards both elements
as dangerous to the regime's stability. [Ref. 22: p. 149]
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Other internal threats are less intense but still
must be considered. Arab Nationalism remains a factor with-
in Egypt. This movement, led by radical Arab Muslims and
supported by Libya's Colonel Qaddafi, is a continuous source
of concern for the Mubarak government.
A desire for educational equality is more of a moti-
vation than it is a source of instability, at least among
the Egyptian elites. Egyptians seek education as a vehicle
for advancement, but the major downfall of the system stems
from the lack of employment opportunities in the private
sector. Most college graduates are employed by an already
top-heavy bureaucratic government, thus exacerbating the
problem of increasing cost of government. In the final
analysis, Egypt's major sources of internal threat are
based on the weak economy and lack of a fully representative
government.
2 . External Threats
With Mubarak's succession to power, Egypt's rhetoric
about external threats has become somewhat reduced.
Mubarak, while tempering Cairo's relations with Washington
in recent months has moved cautiously but steadily towards
renewing relations with Moscow. Mubarak has apparently
tried to withdraw Egypt from the East-West conflict by
establishing a sort of Pax-Egyptian with the two superpowers.
Expansion of Egypt's economic base is also a prime factor in
his decision.
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Mubarak's main external concerns revolve around
Camp David and the weakening relations with Israel. Egypt,
as Mubarak well knows, cannot afford, either politically or
economically, another war with Israel. Mubarak wants to
avoid potential conflicts and devote maximum time and re-
sources to rebuilding Egypt's economy and political struc-
ture. He stated, "that Egypt's commitments to the accords
would be met and that Egypt's return to the Arab fold would
not be at the expense of the peace agreements" [Ref. 22:
p. 158]. As will be noted later, this commitment is not
without cost.
Egypt has also wavered in its anti-Libyan rhetoric
in favor of a more anti-confrontational attitude. Mubarak
stated that Egypt does not want war with her neighbors,
African, Jews or Arab [Ref. 23]. That does not imply that
Egypt will sacrifice its southern ally Sudan to Qaddafi
expansionism. Clearly, radical Arab opposition remains an
external threat of concern to Egypt.
3. Domestic Priorities
Hosni Mubarak's priorities lie first of all in
solving the country's economic problems.* He must find ways
to reinvigorate the economy and reduce Egypt's dependency
*Mubarak's current five year economic plan, (1982-87)
emphasizes growth of the agricultural and industrial sectors
A strong dependency on foreign investments remains a major
theme in his program. Mubarak has called for austerity
measures to reduce the national debt.
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on foreign powers. [Ref. 24] Mubarak must also reduce
the domestic political strife by granting greater repre-
sentation, yet while maintaining control of the government
through the NDP . Finally, Egypt must continue to support
the Camp David Accord in order to avert another Arab-
Israeli war. Accomplishing this while reestablishing ties
with the Arab world will require a balanced and pragmatic
approach.
C. SUDAN
Sudan is the largest country in Africa, yet its popula-
tion is small, backward and factionalized. The Sudanese
government has claimed that external threats exist from its
neighbors, and has claimed Soviet involvement in the region.
However, the major problems causing instability in Sudan
appear to be domestic in nature.
1. Internal Threats
Arab proverbs often state that when Allah created
Sudan he wept. It's also said that he laughed when the
deed was done. [Ref. 18: P. xxi] Both proverbs serve to
illustrate the diversity of the country and its people.
It is this diversity that represents the root of Sudan's
current internal conflicts and sources of instability.
Sudan is unique in that it is geographically divided
between the Arab and Black African speaking worlds. The
Arab north, which contains approximately 75 percent of
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the Sudanese population, maintains strong ties with the.
Muslim world. Meanwhile, the southern one third of the
nation is inhabited by non-muslim clans with strong ethnic
and cultural ties to Black Africa. [Ref. 18: p. xxii]
Since 1955, a continuous civil war raged throughout
the country with the numerically and politically powerful
Arab north maintaining control over the Black southern
population. President Numeri's major contribution to the
state has been the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. which
granted regional autonomy to the south while maintaining a
limited degree of national unity. However Southern blacks
do not feel that the Northern Arab -dominated assembly has
allocated fair portions of development funds or programs,
despite the fact that the majority of the natural resources
are located in the south. Educational opportunities, social
programs and unfair military conscription laws, and the re-
drawing of the regional boundaries are examples of the in-
equalities cited by Southern opposition groups. This has
led to a renewal of regional factionalism since 1980.
Internal threats to the stability of the Numeri
regime are numerous. Although political threats are intense,
it would seem that the greatest problems are economic.
Sudan imports far exceed their exports, thus creating huge
balance of payments problems. By late 1982 and early 1983 it
became apparent that Sudan would need to reschedule its debt
payments to The International Monetary Fund (IMF), forced
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Numeri to accept harsh austerity measures as part of its
assistance package. [Ref. 25] This, of course, led to the
now common IMF food riots.
Little positive evidence exists supporting Numeri*
s
current economic programs. The government remains unable
to provide security for the oil fields in -the south which
represent Sudan's greatest potential export item. Thus,
economic conditions are also a major source of instability.
Other sources of internal instability are less pro-
nounced. It appears as though the Armed Forces are
"generally" loyal to Numeri. However, political factionalism
within the army has produced numerous coup attempts.
Numeri ' s pro-U.S. position has drawn sharp criticism from his
Arab supporters as well as the Southern opposition. However
this opposition did not stop him from seeking more U.S. mili-
tary assistance in exchange for possible access agreements in
1982 and 1983.
2 . External Threats
Sudan's strategic qualities including: its proximity
to Egypt; access to the Red Sea; and its agricultural poten-
tial makes it a valuable asset to the West as well as to the
Arab world. Its location and pro-U.S. position makes Sudan
a critical player in regional affairs. Surely this fact has
not escaped Khartoum. Numeri in recent years has played the
anti-Soviet trump card in order to gain U.S. recognition and
assistance as well as supporting the Camp David Accords.
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Numeri has also announced that Libya's Colonel
Qaddafi is a tool of the Soviets and that he must be dealt
with accordingly. [Ref. 26] This rhetoric is not sur-
prising since Libya and Sudan have been bitter enemies
since 1976 when Numeri accused Qaddafi of funding and sup-
porting a coup attempt in Sudan. The situation between the
two worsened in 1980 when Qaddafi announced for a second
time (the first time occurred in 1973), the annexation of
the Aouzou strip in northern Chad. The Libyan presence in
Chad was proclaimed by Numeri to represent a threat to
Sudanese security. Khartoum continues to claim that Libya
and the Soviet Union threaten Sudan's security. Since 1981
Libya and Sudan have exchanged harsh rhetoric and several
air to surface rockets. The latest attacks in 1983 led to
the U.S. positioning AWACS aircraft in Egypt.
Another major external threat, as perceived by
Numeri, is the military build-up of forces along the
Ethiopian and Sudanese border. Again Numeri claims Soviet
sponsorship. Efforts towards a rapprochement in 1981 were
squelched when the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was
signed by Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen. This treaty was
designed to target for destabilization any Northeast Africa
nation that sought an alliance with the U.S. [Ref. 27]
3 . Domestic Priorities
Sudan's major sources of internal threat are regional
factionalism and the continuing economic crisis. Numeri must
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seek ways to unify the north and south in order to. reduce
internal strife. He must also formulate economic programs
that will invigorate the national economy and spur internal
*
development on an equitable basis for both North and South
[Ref. 28]. Finally, Sudan must continue to seek secure
borders to the west and south through peaceful means.
D. SOMALIA
The fact that Mohamed Siad Barre has remained in power
for almost fifteen years borders on the miraculous. During
his tenure Somalia has been beset by almost every form of
political and economic setback known in the modern world.
In the face of seemingly unbelievable odds, Siad Barre has
survived. How? It cannot be because of an increase in his
popular support, in fact the reverse is true. One can also
discount the theory that Barre is being propped up by a
major power. Is it by luck that he has survived? Not
really. The most likely answer is that a better alternative
to Barre does not exist. Yet, internal opposition does
exist and has increased in recent years. As in all of the
cases examined thus far, Somalia's sources of instability
are centered on economic and political crises.
*
Economic figures indicate that Numeri has only been
able to generate slight economic growth (GNP increased only
$20 per capita between 1980 and 1982) . Military expendi-
tures decreased slightly during the same period despite a
substantial rise in the percentage of military expenditures
for the total import figures, (from 6.3 percent in 1980 to
13.2 percent in 1982).
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1 . Internal Threats
A useful place to start our analysis of Somalia is
to examine its economy. Somalia ranks among the poorest
and most underdeveloped nations in the world. Its per
capita income is reportedly around $135 per year. [Ref.
19- p. 135] Most of the blame for Somalia's economic
condition justifiably rests with the Barre regime. Soon
after he assumed power in 1969 Barre adopted a "scientific
socialist" ideology which included full nationalization of
the country's meager economic resources. It failed miser-
ably. Somalia's economic problems also stem from Barre 's
decision to initiate the war in the Ogaden in May 1977.
This was a conflict that the Somali people could ill-
afford. In November of that year he ousted the Soviet
advisors in hopes of receiving military and economic assis-
tance from the U.S. For several reasons this aid did not
materialize until early 1978 and never did reach the level
which Barre requested.
In 1980 Barre was pressured by the U.S. and the
World Bank to adopt a modified enterprise economic system.
To date this effort has met with only marginal success.
High oil and food prices, commodities which are critically
short in Somalia and a huge refugee problem continue to
hinder economic growth. As well the widespread drought in
the region has destroyed both Somali livestock and what
little agricultural production the country possessed. In
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sum, Somalia is in deep economic trouble and is totally
dependent on foreign aid for survival.
If it appears that Somalia's economic problems are
insurmountable, we need only consider the regional and
political factionalism to better understand the instability
of the Barre regime. The basis of Somalia's internal prob-
lems are in the deep-seated animosities created originally
at the Berlin Conference in 1884-5. Somalia's independence
was granted in 1960, with the boundaries along colonial
lines, not along the traditional ethnic lines of the Somali
clans. As a result, the achievement of a strong national
identity and unification of the Somali people has never
been accomplished. [Ref. 29] Tribalism has dominated the
Somali political system since independence. Political
parties correspond to specific ethnic and indeed personal
interests. This has created a weak national governmental
system with little or no authority in the periphery.
In the early 1960s the Somali Youth League (SYL) be-
came the dominant national political party. The key to its
platform was the claim to create a Greater Somalia by uni-
fying all Somali people. This phrase referred to the
unification of the Somali people living outside the state
in northern Kenya, eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti. Aid was
sought from the West, but was denied for fear of being
identified as a supporter of Somali irredentism. The SYL
then turned to the Soviet Union for military assistance in
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mid 1960s and began to build what was to become one of the
largest military forces in East Africa [Ref. 19: p. 40].
On October 21, 1969, Siad Barre led a bloodless
coup and installed a scientific socialist government. His
primary goal and strategy was to initiate social and eco-
nomic reforms. Very little growth was realized during the
next seven years. The drought in 1974-5 coupled with the
inability of the Soviets to provide assistance other than
military weakened Barre ' s position. In an effort to rally
his cause Barre ordered the attack into the Ogaden region
of eastern Ethiopia. This proved to be a major mistake for
Barre. His forces were eventually crushed by the Cuban
-
led, Soviet supplied Ethiopian forces. The military was
all but destroyed without a source for rearming and the
already beleaguered economy was in a shambles.
Between 1978 and 1980 the eicorromic situation im-
proved slightly. However, since 1980 things have gotten
progressively worse for the Barre regime. Thwarted coup
attempts have led to an increase in government repression.
Barre has been forced to look towards his tribal ties for
support, an action that he would not have considered in
1969. This has, of course, raised the level of resistance
and opposition from groups such as the Somali National
Movement (SNM) and the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) . Oppo-
sition has been met by increased repression, and so the
cycle continues. These opposition movements, within and
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outside of Somalia, are seeking the common objective of
ousting Siad Barre and reducing government corruption.
Internal sources of threat to the Barre government
run the entire spectrum from economic and political prob-
lems, to resistance to Barre' s willingness to grant the U.S.
military access.
2 . External Threat s
Somalia's greatest source of external threats are
a direct result of their own efforts to re-unify the Somali
people. Neighboring states, including Kenya, Ethiopia and
Djibouti, the majority of the OAU and, for that matter, the
rest of the world clearly perceives Somalia as an aggres-
sive state with irredentist designs. This attitude perme-
ates today in Somali foreign relations, albeit at an
apparently decreased level.
Barre has played the Soviet card in order to gain
limited U.S. support. He used the access agreement of 1980
as a quid pro quo for additional U.S. assistance. [Ref. 30]
Cuban and Soviet presence in Ethiopia continues to facili-
tate, although at an abbreviated level, Barre * s request for
arms.
Other than the Ethiopian and Soviet bloc threat,
the only apparently valid external threat comes indirectly
from Libya. This threat is limited to anti-Barre rhetoric
and economic support for the various opposition groups with-
in Somalia and Ethiopia. The Friendship and Cooperation
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Treaty appears to be the only document that lends validity
to the Barre claim.
3 . Domestic Priorities
Siad Barre must seek ways to minimize the internal
political opposition without increasing repressive measures.
Also, he must find ways to develop an economy, not "the"
*
economy, but "a" economy. This will not be easy given the
limited potential of the state, the current drought and the
massive refugee problem [Ref. 28: pp. 44 and 86]. to reduce
the sources of external threats Barre must attempt to nor-
malize relations with his neighbors. Currently it appears
that the calls for Somali unification are less intense.
This reduction in irredentism may bear fruit for Barre by
allowing him to concentrate on internal matters.
E . KENYA
Until the early 1980s Kenya was considered by most
political and economic analysts as one of Africa's prime
examples of s successful capitalist system. However,
recently internal political opposition increased markedly.
This opposition has threatened the stability of the Daniel
arap Moi regime. Meanwhile Kenya's economic growth decreased
*
Barre has had little success with any economic program.
The national debt has continued to increase while the GNP
has continued its downward slide, (the per capita GNP has
decreased from $337 in 1980 to $307 in 1982). Meanwhile the
percentage of the GNP spent on military equipment has in-
creased from 6.2 percent in 1980 to 8.15 percent in 1982.
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while inflation increased. This economic crisis bred more
political discontent, which in turn provided new impetus to
the rising opposition movements.
1. Internal Threat s
As in the previous cases, the sources of internal
and external threats facing Kenya are closely linked.
Numerous factors are responsible for the economic crisis.
The major problem is Kenya's dangerously high population
growth rate of four percent annually [Ref. 31], This places
a strain on public social programs, exacerbates labor and
housing problems, and creates an imbalance in food imports.
Also, Kenya (like the other cases) has suffered from con-
tinuous inflation. Moreover, less favorable terms of trade
have contributed to the balance of payment problem. These
factors, coupled with a sharp rise in government spending,
the drought which has crippled the agricultural sector,
government support quotas, and an over-dependence on multi-
national investments and aid have contributed to Kenya's
economic troubles. [Ref. 32]
When Moi came to power in 1978 it appeared he would
be more tolerant of political opposition. But as the eco-
nomic crisis increased in intensity, support for Moi's oppo-
sition also grew. By the summer of 1982 Moi and the
ruling party, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) had
solidified itself by passing legislation making it the only
legitimate party in the state. Moi's opposition, headed by
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Odinga Oginga and several leading academics from the
University of Nairobi, were detained and imprisoned for
voicing their discontent. Factions within the Air Force
supported by University atudents attempted a coup, but it
was quickly crushed on 1 August 1982 [Ref . 33] . Part of
the rationale for the coup, as expressed by the rebels, was
to eliminate corruption in government (ironically, this was
also a major goal for the new Moi regime in 1978) and to
end government repression. Moreover, the radical nature of
this attempted coup was similar to other ideologically
based coups in Northeast Africa.
2 . External Threats
Under Moi's tutelage Kenya assumed a very active
role in African and international politics. Kenya's move
from the non-aligned, despite its continued claims of non-
alignment, to a more active role in the East-West conflict
has impacted on Kenyan internal politics as well as external
foreign affairs. Samuel M. Makinda indicates that four
events between 1974 and 1979 may have facilitated this
decision
:
1. The fall of the Haile Selassie in Ethiopia
and his replacement by a socialist junta.
2. The fall of the Portuguese African empire.
3. The collapse of the East African Community
in 1977, which forced Kenya to look elsewhere for regional
markets.
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4. Finally, the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978
forced the new leadership to prove to the West that their
policies would not change. [Ref. 34]
Kenya has always expressed concern for Soviet expan-
sion in Africa. However, following the Soviet/Cuban involve-
ment in the Ogaden War, the fall of the Shah of Iran, and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Nairobi became more adamant
about its position in the East-West conflict.
Kenyan decision makers also see non geo-strategic
sources of external threats. Of major concern is Somalia
with its claims on the Northeastern Province of Kenya.
During the past two years Nairobi has indicated that it
would like closer relations with Mogadishu. Bilateral
meetings with President Barre in both capitols have taken
place and indicate limited success [Ref. 35].
Relations with Tanzania, which have not been cordial
in the past also appear to be warming slightly. President
Moi has reduced his resistance to Dr. Milton Obote's return
to power in Uganda, despite concern that Tanzania may be
controlling him. Obote has actively sought measures to
reduce the tensions between both countries, thus enhancing
stability on Kenya's southern border. Finally, relations
with Sudan and Ethiopia appear on fairly stable ground.
State visits have been conducted and various treaties of
friendship have been signed.
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3. Domestic Priorities
There can be little doubt that the major problems
facing President Moi are economic in nature [Ref. 36].
Political opposition and turmoil will continue to be
sources of instability as long as the Kenyan economy con-
tinues to suffer. Therefore, Moi's major domestic priority
will be to revitalize and reinvigorate Kenya's weakened
economy [Ref. 31: p. 4].
F. SUMMARY
These four nations currently face a variety of internal
and external threats which affect their response to U.S.
requests for access. Fears of direct Soviet intervention,
or by Soviet surrogates within the region pose the greatest
source of external threat. For example, Libyan support of
anti-Barre factions in both Somalia and Ethiopia pose a low
level threat to regional stability. Also, Somalia irreden-
tism continues to serve as a destabilizing factor in the
region, although at a reduced level.
Internal sources of instability center around the in-
herent economic and political weaknesses present in all four
countries. Economic problems stem from a growing balance of
payment deficit, with limited potential for economic growth,
*
Current economic figures indicate that Kenya's economy
is recovering, despite the effects of the drought. Growth
in the GDP in 1983 was 3.9 percent compared to 3.4 percent
in 1982.
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and a growing dependency on Western aid. Other internal
sources of threat evolve from historic political and ethnic
factionalism in these countries.
Tables three and four present a summary of the sources
of instability in each case study nation. Chapter five will
examine how these factors effect the dependability or reli-
ability of access agreements with these four states, and how
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. IMPLICATIONS OF ACCESS
The objective of this chapter is to assess the regional
and geo-strategic implications of U.S. strategic access in
Northeast Africa. To accomplish this we will briefly dis-
cuss the relations between each of the four case study
nations and the U.S. This discussion will hopefully provide
the reader with both the African and American perspectives
from which to analyze the dependability of the current
regimes in these states, and the reliability of current or
future access agreements.
y£~ Reliability or dependability is not a concept which can
be easily measured or quantified. However, the dependabili-
ty of the regimes in power is paramount to the short and
long term reliability of the access agreements, in the
region. The reliability of the agreements can be analyzed
from two perspectives. First, from the U.S. perspective.
American policymakers and defense planners question the
reliability of long-term agreements with these states in the
face of current political and economic instability in the
region. Secondly, from the African perspective, the ques-
tion of whether or not the U.S. will in fact meet its end of




Within the past fourteen years American-Egyptian rela-
tions have radically improved. The efforts of President
Jimmy Carter and Anwar Sadat were primarily responsible for
this turnaround. In many areas including economic, politi-
cal, military, industrial and cultural endeavors, bilateral
agreements were satisfactorily reached and have been suc-
cessfully maintained under Ronald Reagan and Hosni Mubarak.
Egypt has attempted to cultivate a self image of being the
U.S.'s most important regional ally and has endeavored to
make Washington accept this view. But, the U.S. response
to these efforts has been less than what Cairo had hoped
for. [Ref. 3-7] In 1981 the newly elected Reagan
Administration was searching for a strategy to influence
events in the Middle East. It appeared, at least intially,
that the U.S. was leaning heavily in favor of an "Israeli
pillar" for the defense of U.S. interests in the region.
Cairo expressed grave concern that the pro-Israeli
policy would have detrimental effects on the Camp David
process, as well as jeopardize Egypt's economic development
plans, which were totally dependent on U.S. military and
economic aid. Sadat in no uncertain terms informed
President Reagan that this U.S. policy was very dangerous
to U.S ./Egyptian relations and would not be tolerated.
Apparently Sadat's threats made Washington realize that it
must soften its approach. By late 1981 additional military
and economic agreements were reached.
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Cairo and Washington have both argued that Soviet
intervention into the region was the major outside threat
to regional security. In addition to the Soviet threat,
Egypt had several other reasons to intensify its requests
for U.S. military assistance. First, refurbishment of the
Egyptian armed forces with new American equipment was a
high priority. This modernization not only deterred radi-
cal neighboring states, but also equalized the military
balance of power with Israel. Secondly, the military,
which if dissatisfied could become a prime source of
internal threats, had been calling for a modernization of
its forces. Military leaders were seeking to standardize
the equipment of the armed forces, thus reducing the inter-
operability factor so pronounced by the mix of old Soviet
equipment and second rate western weapons systems. Lastly,
the overall assistance package included funds designed to
generate growth in Egypt's infant arms industry as well as
enhance overall economic development.
However, by 1982 the U.S. /Egyptian relations were once
again strained. Several major factors revolving around the
question of U.S. access to Egyptian facilities and the
reliability of access agreements were instrumental in this
process.
First, looking at the reliability issue from the
Egyptian standpoint one must be reminded of the strong anti-
imperialistic feeling that runs throughout Egypt and the
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Middle East in general. A brutal history of occupation by
foreign powers, European in particular, has left a negative
impact on the Egyptian people. French and British inter-
vention and occupations dating back to the early 1800s
provided the impetus for the creation of an intense Arab
nationalist movement in Egypt unparalleled anywhere in the
Middle East, This movement by the late 1940s not only
called for a revampment of the domestic political and eco-
nomic systems, but also called for the total elimination of
Western domination. [Ref. 38] This continuous resistance
is the basis for Arab unwillingness to grant military ac-
cess to the west. Therefore, agreements for access are not
only difficult to obtain, but may be subject to repudiation.
Like his predecessors, Hosni Mubarak is acutely aware
of this bloody history and consequently has been unwilling
to grant total guaranteed unconditional access or permanent
basing to any western power, including U.S. forces. Instead
the U.S. was granted "periodic" access to various facili-
ties. This reluctance by Egypt has led to what is expressed
as a lack of the spirit of "true friendship." U.S. percep-
tions of reliability will be discussed below, but it is im-
portant to note a major complicating factor at this point.
As noted in chapter three, the facilities at Ras Banas are
critical to USCENTCOM's mission. Over $525 million dollars
was approved for use in upgrading these facilities in 1981,
but because of the inability to gain a guaranteed access
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clause, Congress has refused to provide the requested funds.
To date, satisfactory arrangements still have not been made,
nor have any substantial improvements to the facilities
been accomplished.
It would appear that Cairo has been forced to distance
itself from Washington primarily because of the lack of
sensitivity towards the Arab cause by the Reagan
Administration. Statements by senior administration offi-
cials have given the Egyptian leadership much cause to
question the reliability of U.S. commitments in the Middle
East. It was mentioned earlier that when Reagan assumed
the Presidency, Washington's policies, whether intentionally
or not, signalled a shift towards Israel. President Reagan
when asked by a correspondent whether he considered the
Israeli settlements on the West Bank to be illegal, respon-
ded by saying "No, I don't. I really don't." Other ad-
ministration officials including Secretary of State Schultz
and Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick have also made statements
which have alarmed those Egyptians who continue to support
Camp David. [Ref. 39] Cairo continues to be cautious of
U.S. -Israeli relations, thus making Egypt wary of U.S.
resolve in the region.
In spite of these statements, President Mubarak has put
himself cut on the proverbial limb by calling for support of
the September 1982 Reagan Plan, which calls for establishing
an autonomous Palestinian confederation by linking the
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Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza to Jordan. He also
called upon the Palestinians to unilaterally recognize
Israeli's right to exist. [Ref. 39: p. 30]
When looking at the reliability of access agreements
from thai U.S. viewpoint , one must put events into perspec-
tive following Sadat's ousting of the Soviets in 1972.
Skeptics in Washington did not really believe that Egypt was
serious about its reversal. Many conservatives in
Washington expressed grave concern over the "ideological
flexibility" or "political opportunism" of the countries of
the Middle East. Israeli lobbyists became active in creating
an aura of uncertainty regarding the motives behind Sadat's
"open door" policy.
In sum, Egypt possesses the most militarily desirable
facilities in Northeast Africa for use by USCENTCOM. But
Egyptian fears of Western domination, coupled with the
responses of radical Arabs deters the attainment of access
agreements on terms favorable to the United States. To
complicate matters, defense planners must grapple with con-
servative factions in Congress that fear another Egyptian
ideological reversal. During this election year, it appears
doubtful that the Pentagon will pressure Congress for addi-
tional funds for military construction in Egypt. Continued
pressures from Israeli groups will also deter these efforts
until after the U.S. elections.
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B . SUDAN
As pointed out in chapter four President Numeri faces
serious sources of internal and external threats. These
problems are placing Washington in a somewhat precarious
position. Numeri 's stability is much in doubt, yet
Washington continues to support Sudan with military and
economic assistance, apparently for a mix of strategic and
regional reasons.
Congressman Howard Wolpe, Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on African Affairs, stated that, "Under
President Numeri, Sudan has become a good friend to the
United States." Numeri supported the Camp David Accords,
much to the chagrin of the moderate Arab states, Saudi
Arabia in particular. By reestablishing diplomatic ties with
Egypt, (there was a period in the early 1970s that formal
relations were terminated) , Numeri became a target of in-
ternal criticism and external pressures by radical Arab
states such as Libya. Apparently as a reward for this sup-
port, and to thwart Libyan activities on Sudan's western
borders, in 1981 the U.S. significantly increased military
and economic assistance in Africa. [Ref. 40] But the rela-
tionship between Sudan and the U.S. has not always been so
friendly and warm.
Jafar Al-Numeri came to power in 1969 in a military coup
and quickly proved to be a skillful politician. During his
first years of power Numeri ' s regime was distinctly radical
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and clearly tied to the Communist Party. During the early
Numeri years Sudan forged close diplomatic and economic
relations with China and the Soviet Union. Simultaneously
Numeri was moving towards greater Arab unity by joining the
United Arab Republic (UAB) . The move towards unification
between Sudan, Egypt, and Libya was not acceptable to Moscow
or the local Communist Party because of strains in relations
created by the divergent muslim beliefs and the communist
ideology. An abortive coup was attempted in July, 1971,
which resulted in the dismissal of the Communist party
representatives from Sudan. [Ref. 41]
During this phase, relations with U.S. were non-existent.
Egypt, which historically had been a close ally to Sudan,
ousted the Soviet's in 1972 and attempted to gain a cease
fire with Israel following the 1973 War. These efforts even-
tually resulted in the Camp David Accords, and closer U.S.-
Egyptian relations. Sudan followed suit by also seeking
better relations with the West, and the U.S. in particular.
Numeri 's greatest political achievement was the 1972
Addis Ababa agreement, which theoretically guaranteed
regional autonomy to the predominantly Black Christian South.
This agreement ended a 17-year old civil war and proved to
Black Africa and the West that Numeri was a masterful politi-
cal tactician and a man with enormous potential. Western
developers began spending vast sums on development projects
throughout Sudan. Meanwhile, Arab states, now with large
surpluses of capital but lacking an agricultural base, began
investing in Sudan with hopes of making it the "Breadbasket
of the Arab World.
"
Unfortunately, Numeri's success was short lived. As
indicated in chapter four the economic problems, coupled
with the renewal of the North-South factionalism have done
little to bolster Washington's confidence in Numeri. But
the Reagan Administration continues to provide economic and
military assistance at what must be considered a considerable
risk. The reliability factor, from Washington's perspective,
centers around the question of Numeri's stability in either
the short or the long term. Although he has survived for
over 15 years under difficult conditions, the U.S. cannot be
assured that it is not jeopardizing the chances for future
access agreements by continuing to support a weak or "lame
duck" regime. Considering the worst case scenario, Numeri
could be replaced by a more fundamentalist regime that does
not have strong ties to Egypt, and does not desire a U.S.
presence in Sudan. Several other variations of this scenario
exist, to include a coup attempt by a Soviet-sponsored
faction. The likelihood of this happening is quite remote
given the strong anti-Soviet position of both the Arab North
and the Black South. Other possible scenarios include an-
other Numeri reversal, such as the recent indications that
he may be changing his mind about the total Islamization of
the state and perhaps withdrawing his opposition to the re-
unification of the South. [Ref. 42]
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From a different perspective, Numeri may see the question
of access as vital to Sudan's security and therefore as
vital to its national security. Presently he believes that
Egypt and Washington will not allow the Sudan to fall to
potentially unfriendly control. Therefore, by granting the
U.S. access he believes that the agreements enhance his
regime's survivability.
From a more negative perspective, providing U.S. military
access may be adding fuel to the fire. In April 1981 Numeri
expressed an interest in obtaining American aid for the pur-
pose of upgrading and improving naval and air facilities in
Port Sudan and Khartoum. This aid was to be in exchange for
limited U.S. access during a crisis in the region. This
offer intensified internal opposition to Numeri. Mohammed
Bashir Hamid wrote, "Over identification with U.S. plans and
interest could turn out to be a dubious and risky undertaking
for the Sudanese regime." Another senior official states,
"That some countries are calling us U.S. puppets." [Ref. 35,
p. bl02] This agreement also exacerbated his problems with
the Arab states and possibly increased the risk of negative
actions by neighboring pro-Soviet states. Numeri, despite
internal opposition and increased fear of external threat,
has apparently strengthened his pro-Egyptian/American ties,
while moving towards an Islamization of the state.
It is this author's opinion that economic pragmatism is
Numeri' s primary rationale for what appears to be an
irrational policy towards greater U.S. access. As argued
above, the major threats to the Numeri regime are internal
political and economic unrest. It would appear that Numeri
has chosen to deepen relations with U.S. in order to receive
assistance in exchange for access for USCENTCOM. While the
clouds surrounding the regional Arab situation clear, mean-
ing that either a solution to the Palestinian issue is found,
or a greater sense of Arab unity is achieved, it would ap-
pear that Sudan will not seek additional economic aid from
the moderate Arabs. These conditions or alternatives do not
appear likely in the near future, therefore Numeri must con-
tinue to depend on the U.S. to help eliminate the economic
sources of instability and thus ensure his political survival.
C. SOMALIA
American-Somali relations can be described as cautious,
skeptical and very situationally dependent. When President
Mohammed Siad Barre ousted the Soviet contingent in November
1977, he was convinced that the West would grant military aid
to Somalia. This did not materialize. Barre ' s request for
military assistance during the 1977-78 war with Ethiopia was
initially denied and later granted on a more limited basis.
The Carter Administration conditionally agreed to a vastly
scaled down assistance package after the withdrawal of
Somali forces from Ethiopia was confirmed. Between seven and
eight million dollars worth of economic aid was provided
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between July 1977 and January 1978. In 1978 a military
assistance package was approved by Washington, with the pro-
vision that the weapons would be used strictly for defensive
purposes. The Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia alarmed
the "hawks" within the Carter Administration, particularly
Zbigniew Brzezinski. Following the pronouncement of the
Carter Doctrine in 1980, it was determined that Somalia
would have a more important geo-strategic role. Somali
facilities provided an important link to the chain of lo-
gistical and operational facilities needed to support the
military aspects of the Carter Doctrine.
As outlined in chapter four, Siad Barre is facing
seemingly insurmountable internal and external threats to his
regime. Washington is well aware of his regime's instability
and has approached Barre with caution. Another less apparent
reason for Washington's caution is that there are hopes that
eventually Cuba and the Soviets will leave Ethiopia making it
possible for the U.S. to return, albeit in a somewhat differ-
ent capacity than enjoyed under Haile Selassie. Ethiopia has
always been considered the plum of the Horn, both economically
and politically. Washington is aware that relations with both
states are quite impossible. With that in mind, policy plan-
ners and strategic thinkers are not really willing to put
their eggs in the Somali basket.
Another reason for Washington to question Barre ' s reli-
ability stems from the perennial calls for a Greater Somalia.
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As long as this irredentist attitude prevails, Washington
will endeavor not to give the impression to Somalia or the
OAU that the U.S. supports Somali unification via military
actions.
From the Somali perspective, the reliability of the U.S.
is also in question. The arms promised in the 1980 access
agreement were extremely slow in coming and eventually the
terms were modified, (cancellation of the 12 Vulcan Anti-
Aircraft Systems). [Ref. 35: p. b264]
Unlike Mubarak in Egypt, Barre is unable to operate from
a position of strength in dealing with the U.S. for several
reasons. First, Barre ' s domestic base of support is so weak
that he constantly must protect himself. During the past
fifteen years he has become increasingly adroit in the art
of self-preservation. But, his time may be running out.
Washington's reluctance to expand the military assistance
programs to Somalia is closely linked to the Barre regime's
instability. Secondly, from a purely military standpoint,
the facilities in Somalia are important to USCENTCOM, but do
have limitations. Somalia's geographic proximity makes its
facilities a more susceptible target for anti-U.S. forces
staged from either South Yemen or Ethiopia, thus reducing
the willingness of U.S. defense planners to operate from
Somali facilities. Also, from a purely economic standpoint,
it would require vast sums of money to upgrade the facili-
ties to a fully operational status. A third reason for
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Barre ' s weakened position is the OAU's continued opposition
to the Pan-Somali claims. Despite Somalia's claim to have
given up its desire for Djibouti and the Northeastern
Province of Kenya, the greater Somali movement remains a
concern for the OAU.
The Reagan Administration has continued to slowly move
towards strengthening U.S. -Somali relations. Access agree-
ments are tendered very carefully so as not to provoke Black
Africa, including Ethiopia and not send a false signal to
the Pan-Somali groups seeking a military solution to their
quest. Most importantly, Washington wants to ensure that in
the event that Barre is overthrown, U.S. -Somali relations
will be maintained, thereby allowing continued access in
Berbera and Mogadishu.
D . KENYA
Relations between Kenya and the U.S. have traditionally
been friendly and warm. American missionaries, tourists and
businesses have been attracted to this, the most pro-western
state in East Africa. Together with Great Britain, the U.S.
strategy towards Kenya has sought to promote economic and
political development along the Western model. [Ref. 31:
p. 7] This strategy has been and remains mutually accept-
able to both the U.S. and Kenya.
In recent years however the aura of stability surrounding
Kenya has been tarnished by ecomomic and internal political
strife. In March 1980, the U.S. and Kenya reached an
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extensive access agreement which has exacerbated President
Daniel Arap Moi's internal problems. Before discussing the
implications of the agreement, let us digress briefly to
highlight the factors which led to the agreement. These
factors include: (1) Soviet adventurism in the region; (2)
Somali irredentism regarding the Northeastern Province in
Kenya; (3) historical tensions with Uganda and Tanzania; and,
(4) finally, a faltering economy which has given rise to
greater internal opposition. President Moi has attempted to
move Kenya from its traditional nonaligned role. He sought
to generate prestige for Kenya by bringing that state into a
more active role in the East-West debate. Moi wanted Kenya
to be part of the U.S. deterrence strategy in the Northwest
quadrant of the Indian Ocean. Kenya's ruling elite was
anxious to prove to the U.S. that Kenya desired a role in
the containment of the Soviet Union.
An important byproduct of increased U.S. access in the
Horn is the apparent rapprochement is somewhat novel. Since
independence Kenya and Somalia have been enemies, again pri-
marily due to the Somali claims to the NFD. However, the U.S.
has apparently persuaded both protagonists to search for ways
to settle their differences. Washington, of course, does
not want the two countries fighting each other with American
trained and supplied armies.
What are the costs or implications of Kenya's close ties
to the U.S.? As in most third world countries there is a
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reluctance to side with either superpower. Kenya has en-
joyed a history of neutrality in most conflicts. However,
this access agreement jeopardizes her position as a non-
aligned African power. Internal opposition to greater ties
with the U.S. also is of major concern to Moi. The March
1980 access agreements were reached without debate in the
Kenyan parliament. This decision provided greater credi-
bility to opposition claims that Moi is an "American
Puppet." The rapprochement with Somalia may also have
negative effects. Ethiopia has normally been less of a
threat to Kenyan interests. By negotiating with Mogadishu
Kenya may be taking a security risk with serious
consequences.
Kenya is dependent on the U.S. to accomplish certain
tasks: First, to assist in the economic development of
Kenya; secondly, to ensure the Somali irredentist claims are
reduced; and thirdly, to protect Western interest in the
region, including Persian Gulf oil, Indian Ocean sea lanes,
and multi-national corporations operating within Kenya.
From the U.S. perspective the reliability of the access
agreements appear to be on firm ground. Although Kenya does
not provide the optimal strategic location for USCENTCOM's
forces, it does possess what would appear to be the best
political situation of the four cases. Following in
Kenyatta's footsteps, Moi has demonstrated that Kenya can
play a useful role in the international community. Although
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Washington follows very closely Kenya's internal political
affairs, little doubt has been expressed concerning the
reliability of Kenya as a strategic ally.
E. SUMMARY
For each of these cases, there exists several major fac-
tors which prevent or inhibit the attainment of U.S. access
in Northeast Africa. Fear that an American presence threat-
ens their sovereignty is a theme expressed by Arab groups
and various opposition groups in Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia.
This resistance to an increased U.S. military presence has
deterred Cairo from grantingunconditional access, much to
Washington's chagrin. Sudan remains one of the largest
recipients of U.S. assistance, yet Washington is skeptical
about the reliability of the Numeri regime. In Somalia's
case, Siad Barre actively seeks a greater U.S. presence, but
Washington remains wary of embracing the Barre regime in
light of its current instability. Agreements with Kenya
appear stable, however, President Moi must not only consider
internal economic matters, but he must also be sensitive to
political opposition to the current American access
agreement.
The implications of U.S. access are not lightly consid-
ered. These four states each have reasons for either resist-
ing or seeking a greater U.S. presence. To reduce the
threats discussed in chapter four, the U.S. provides
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substantial military and economic assistance to these
nations. These programs will be examined in the next
chapter.
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VI . SECURITY ASSISTANCE INSTRUMENTS
Since World War II the United States has sought to deter
or contain Soviet expansion by building relations with key
actors. in strategically located regions of the world. A key
instrument for implementing this cooperative defense system
with allied and friendly governments has been security as-
sistance programs in the form of economic support and arms
transfers. [Ref. 42] The Reagan Administration's policies
are designed to strengthen America's international position.
As apparent by current policy, Mr. Reagan intends to utilize
security assistance as a means to accomplish this task.
Whether or not the policy is politically prudent is beyond
the scope of this study and will not be addressed.
This chapter assesses the current security assistance
programs offered in exchange for strategic access in the
four case study countries. We have previously established
in this study a priority of access for USCENTCOM, indicated
the sources of threat facing these African states, and
stated what the perceived domestic priorities of each state
should be. We will now look at the actual military assis-
tance agreements themselves to determine if a relationship
exists between USCENTCOM 1 s needs, the threats facing the
states, and the security assistance to each of these states.
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A. TYPES OF ASSISTANCE
U.S. security assistance is designed to advance or en-
hance national interests in the following ways:
1. Provide arms, weapons and military equipment to
allies and friends for self-defense.
2. Deter outside .intervention in areas of national
interest to America.
3. Enhance U.S. relations with regional agreements in
order to gain strategic access for U.S. military forces.
4. Promote economic and social stability within various
regions of the world. [Ref. 43]
Based on the perceived threats and domestic priorities in
the Northeast African region, one would conclude that the
last item mentioned above would be the most important. The
Commission on Economic and Security Assistance provides a
succinct summation:
Security from internal and external threats is essential
for the evolution of democratic institutions and economic
development. Economic development cannot proceed in a
turbulent and insecure environment. Military assistance
often provides the critical means to deter and repel
threats to security, thus permitting development.
[Ref. 43]
With this as a frame of reference, let us briefly look at
the various forms of assistance and determine which are the
most feasible for the use in Northeast Africa. However,
before discussing the types of assistance programs, an impor-
tant fact should be pointed out about security assistance
programs. The figures and terms of the agreements are fluid
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and therefore subject to modification or termination at any
time. The decision making process within both the supplier
and recipient governments i s invariably linked to the ful-
fillment of the obligations. Also, the figures of the
agreements seldom reflect the actual delivery of the funds,
systems or training packages. These variables must be. care-
fully considered when attempting to analyze raw dollar
figures. [Ref. 44]
1. Economic Support Fund
The Economic Support Fund (ESF) provides the reci-
pient nation with a means to develop its infrastructure or
other critical internal developmental projects, or as a
means to meet a balance of payment problem. [Ref. 43: p. 18]
It is designed to reduce internal instability produced by
economic and political chaos. Theoretically ESF programs are
flexible in nature and can be adjusted for either short or
long term development projects.
All four of the countries in our study are beset by
severe economic crises. Accordingly economic development
ranks high in terms of their domestic priorities. Appendix
A indicates ESF budgeted funds for all four states from




Foreign Military Sales (FMS) represents a government
to government sale of arms, equipment or services. Ideally
the transaction is accomplished on a cash basis, but can be
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financed via one of three U.S. government programs:
Department of Defense Guaranteed Credit, Direct Credit, or
Waivered Credit. [Ref. 44: p. 127] These sales are de-
signed to strengthen our allies by increasing their defen-
sive posture, thus reducing the need for direct U.S. troop
involvement.
FMS assistance increased sharply between the early
1970s and the early 1980s. Reasons for this increase exist
both on the geo-strategic as well as at the regional plain.
The reintensification of the East-West conflict following
the events in Southwest Asia in the late 1970s can assume
the major responsibility for this trend. But, other factors
such as the increased availability of capital from oil reve-
nues* in the Middle East and the increased production capa-
bility in Western Europe led to a competetive arms market.
President Reagan in seeking ways to strengthen the
U.S. position in the world determined that arms sales would
once again become a primary factor in U.S. foreign relations.
American planners have sought ways to regain and maintain
regional influence in Northeast Africa to counter the Soviet
presence in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Arms sales, or grants
were an acceptable mode to gain this influence or, in the
long run gain military access, to facilities in the region.
In exchange for continuing support of the Camp David process,
the U.S. has supported Egypt's request for military equipment
and arms as well as economic aid. Sudan, Somalia and
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long-time ally, Kenya, have become key players in the con-
tainment of Soviet expansion within the Northwest quadrant
of the Indian Ocean.
The reader is reminded that agreements, especially
FMS programs do not always mean the terms of the agreement
are fulfilled as designed. In fact, often less than half of
the services or equipment specified in the agreement ever
reach the recipient country. [Ref. 44: p. 130] Appendix B
presents data (in constant 1977 dollars) for worldwide
agreements and deliveries between 1974-1980 better illus-
trating this disparity.
As mentioned at the top of this subsection, FMS pro-
grams are ideally established on a purely cash basis. How-
ever, clearly not all of the U.S. recipients, in fact few,
are able to pay cash for FMS purchases. The four states in
this study obviously fall into this category. Therefore, a
critical aspect to FMS programs is the method of payment or,
in these cases, forms of credit available for arms purchases.
Egypt ranks second in the world to Israel in terms of
total U.S. FMS credits received. Because of its unique and
important role in the Middle East peace process, Egypt to-
gether with Israel has received these credits on a "forgiven"
basis, meaning that they will not be required to repay FMS
credits.
In order to reduce the debt problems within the other
three Northeast African states, and in fact worldwide, the
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Reagan Administration initiated a program which requires
concessional interest rates for lesser developed nations.
These rates are determined by economic needs and ability to
pay of each state, [Ref. 43: p. 16] thus maximizing flexi-
bility of the assistance program. Based on these criteria,
Egypt and Kenya were programmed for FMS credit for FY 1984
and 1985 as indicated in Appendix C. Sudan and Somalia were
not granted FMS credit for several reasons. First, the
source of external threats was perceived as important, but
as less intense. Secondly, and more importantly, neither
country could afford FMS credit under any terms unless it
were forgiven credit.
3. Military Assistance Programs
The Military Assistance Program (MAP) provides grant
funds to states for the purpose of buying weapons for de-
fense. Between the 1950s and the mid 1970s MAP was the
U.S.'s primary assistance instrument. [Ref. 44: p. 156]
This is no longer the case. By the mid-1970s western Europe
and Japan were industrially capable of building their own
weapons or buying U.S. systems. But more importantly, the
now capital rich countries were able and in fact desired to
purchase weapons on a cash basis.
In the early 1980s the world-wide recession and the
oil glut reduced the recipient countries 1 ability to pay.
Sudan, Somalia and Kenya's economic plight have put them in
a position where they are unable to qualify for FMS credits,
yet are considered important in the overall U.S. strategy.
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Therefore, these three countries have been earmarked for MAP
grants in FY 1985 as indicated in Appendix D. Egypt, because
of its most favored basis was granted FMS forgiven credits
and therefore does not need MAP grants.
4 . International Military Education and Training
Programs
The International Military Education and Training
Program (IMET) provides grant aid to chosen countries for the
purpose of training and education of foreign military person-
nel. For the U.S. this program is a relatively low-cost/low
risk way of gaining influence in a particular third world
country via its intelligentsia. [Ref. 43: p. 27]
IMET programs provide future leaders of these
nations with important exposure to American culture, tradi-
tions and military doctrine. Both the supplier and the
recipient nations reap benefits from this relationship.
These personnel once trained in American technology, manage-
ment skills and values hopefully return to their homes and
contribute to the internal development of the recipient
nation.
All four of the states concerned in our study are
active participants in the IMFT programs. (See Appendix E)
This relationship hopefully will facilitate the acquisition
of access for USCENTCOM, as well as reduce in some small
ways the inoperability of U.S. and African/Arab military
structures.
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Figure 6. Assistance Programs to Southwest Asia
B. SUMMARY
The Reagan Administration's policies reflect a willing-
ness to use arras transfers and economic assistance as a
means to increase America's influence in the world. Assis-
tance programs targeted at Northeast Africa, which are
depicted in figure six and table four, are designed to ac-
complish two things: first, to create regional stability
by reducing the internal and external sources of threats in
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allied states; secondly, to enhance U.S. access in the
region. U.S. assistance programs in the region appear to be
consistent with the needs of the states and the overall U.S.
objectives
.
Having said chat, it is now necessary to put the analy-
sis together in order to determine if access in Northeast
Africa is feasible for USCENTCOM. If not, then alternatives
to access must be explored. Alternative options is the sub-
ject of the next chapter.
TABLE 4
MAJOR FUNDED PROGRAMS, FY 198 5






















Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance
Programs, FY 198 5, and Foreign Military Sales, Forei gn Mili -
tary Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts
,
Department of Defense, DSAA, 30 September 1983.
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VII. ALTERNATIVES TO ACCES S
In light of the current political situation in Northeast
Africa, it does not appear feasible for the U.S. to maintain
even a low-level military presence in the region. This
chapter will briefly examine several alternatives to U.S.
strategic access, or options that could satisfy or supplant
USCENTCOM's access requirements.
It was stated at the outset that the political and mili-
tary viability of USCENTCOM's mission would not be examined
in this study. However, our analysis has raised some basic
and important questions which concern viability. Viability
can not be addressed without a brief discussion of some of
the inherent weaknesses of USCENTCOM's organizational make-
up. As the discussion of alternatives progresses, these
weaknesses and their importance will become more evident to
the reader. Jeffrey Record provides a fairly succinct, yet
encompassing analysis of these weaknesses which include:
1. Lack of strategic mobility—e.g., the inability to
get the forces to the target ares.
2. Lack of organic tactical mobility and firepower.
3. Dependence on a shore-based logistical
infrastructure
.
4. The inability to secure possible points of entry in
the target area. [Ref. 1: p. 61]
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Other factors include: the multiple operational taskings of
units earmarked for USCENTCOM; the lack of cohesive allied
support programs with NATO countries; and the absence of a
clearly defined threat, reduces the viability of USCENTCOM.
Needless to say, a more detailed analysis of the viability
issue is warranted in future studies, however it far exceeds
the purview of this project.
A. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS
Three options exist for defense planners. Option one
would be to repudiate the Carter Doctrine and eliminate
USCENTCOM as an operational force. A second option would be
to completely revamp the organizational structure and the
mission of the command. This option would call for scaling
down the force from its present 300,000 man multi-service
figure, to a smaller purely Navy-Marine combat force. A
final option, which appears to be the current administration's
approach, would be to maintain the current force structure
and reducing its lack of strategic mobility weaknesses.
1. Option One
Option one would require vast changes in current
American foreign policy, not only in the Middle East, but
elsewhere in the world. This option would signal the adop-
tion of a neo-isolationist outlook. Western Europe and
Japan, which are dependent on Middle Eastern oil, would no
longer have the promise of American military intervention
available to ensure their continued access to this oil.
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Although this option would delete the need for regional
access, it is directly contrary to current U.S. national
interests and objectives.
A unilateral withdrawal of American military commit-
ments in the region could create a power vacuum, thereby
allowing an expansion of Soviet influence. Conversely,
option one could possibly eliminate the East-West issue from
regional politics. Moreover, the withdrawal of U.S. forces,
or the reduced possibility of U.S. intervention may enhance
regional stability by suppressing the fears of Western
imperialism.
The likelihood of option one occurring is extremely
remote under the Reagan Administration, and for that matter
even less so under a possible Mondaie Administration. Mr.
Mondale no doubt has vivid memories of the events that took
place in Southwest Asia during his tenure as Vice President.
He would not want to see an increase of Soviet influence in
the region while he was in office. Ronald Reagan's defense
policies clearly indicate that U.S. force projection is
vital to regional security, and therefore will not eliminate
USCENTCOM.
2 . Option Two
Option two would call for a major restructuring of
the organizational makeup of the RDF. These modifications
are coupled closely with option one in that the force pro-
jection capabilities would not be eliminated, but would be
significantly reduced. American resolve would be much in
question by our allies and potential adversaries alike.
Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in the
late 1960s, American military forces have represented the
major deterrence force. By reducing the size of USCENTCOM,
the U.S. could be signaling a major shift in our strategic'
interest.
As proposed by Jeffrey Record, this force would con-
sist of an all Navy-Marine fleet force with its organic
aviational and support assets. Record's recommended solu-
tion is to replace USCENTCGM with a small, agile, tactically
capable intervention force that is based at sea, governed by
a single, unified command, and supported by expanded sea
power, especially forcible-entry capabilities. Record ex-
plains that this organization would be operational in the
area on a continuous basis, logistically self-sufficient,
and not require access at any shore facilities, thus elimi-
nating its major weaknesses. [Ref. 1: P- 69]
Mr. Record's solutions are far more detailed and
include additional concepts such as giving the airborne
mission to the Marine Corps, and the creation of a 5th Fleet,
under Marine Corps control. [Ref. 1: pp. 71-72] By them-
selves the solutions may prove very functional, albeit there
would be great resistance from the Department of the Army.
But one major problem exists in Record's suggestions, namely
that the Department of the Navy, which includes the Marine
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Corps, can not presently support his plan. Ships and sup-
port vessels do not exist in the current inventory in suffi-
cient quantity. in other words, we must continue to plan
for war with the available assets. Option three will dis-
cuss plans for upgrading the fleet, but it nowhere comes
near to the forces required by Record's recommendations.
A basic question that must be considered with regard
to either option one or two is, what is the threat? Are we
primarily concerned with internal instability within key
regional states, or are we looking at a full-scale Soviet
invasion via Afghanistan or Iran? Regardless of the plausi-
bility of either of the first two options, current U.S.
strategy appears to be driven, whether correctly or not by
the Soviet threat. As will be seen later this may or may
not be an accurate assumption.
3. Option Three
Option three could be called the status quo opera-
tional policy. This option calls for maintaining and actu-
ally enlarging USCENTCOM. Under this option, USCENTCOM'S
mission would remain unchanged. There are however three
areas which are to be improved and considered in order to
enhance mission accomplishment.
The first area is the continued upgrading and expan-
sion of the strategic mobility. This area would involve the
greatest additional cost of the improvement efforts. These
efforts are aimed at improving the air and sealift capabili-
ties of the force.
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Airlift, the most flexible and rapid-force projec-
tion resource is vital to USCENTCOM. The Defense Department
plans to add cargo aircraft to both the military fleet as
well as the cargo capabilities of the civil fleet. [Ref. 45]
In addition to requesting funds for additional C-5B and
KC-10 tanker aircraft, DOD has also requested research and
development funds for the C-17 cargo aircraft which would
supplement the C-130 as an intratheatre transport. [Ref. 45:
p. 179]
Sealift is also vital, not only as a projectionary
force, but more importantly for sustainabiiity of U.S. com-
bat forces. Again, this program entails improving not only
the U.S. naval assets, but also civilian U.S. flag carriers.
As proposed by DOD, this program contains four separate
features including: Fast Sealift which are converted SL-7
container ships; the Ready Reserve Force, which emphasizes
the link between civil transport and possible war contingen-
cies; Container Ship Utilization, which allows for the stor-
age of heavy military equipment or supplies at sea in a
semi-ready condition; and lastly, the Sealift Discharge
Program, which makes the loading and unloading operations
possible at austere or damaged ports. [Ref. 45: pp. 180-181]
The second method to improve the strategic mobility
factor and enhance the mission accomplishment is closely
linked to access and at improvements in air and sea lift
capability. This method is the prepositioning of combat
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equipment, and support materials near the area of operations.
Prepositioning reduces the movement requirements of the
forces. As should be clear by this time, prepositioning,
which was one of the primary levels of access discussed in
chapter three, requires some type of access agreement. Thus
far the political situation in the region has prevented the
prepositioning of U.S. equipment or supplies for use by
USGENICOM.
As mentioned above, prepositioning can also be accom-
plished on various types of ships within the fleet. Criti-
cal to the sea-based prepositioning concept is the tiny
island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The sea-based
prepositioning system currently uses Diego Garcia as the
center of operations. This Near-Term Prepositioning Force
(NTPF) , currently consists of seven ships with enough equip-
ment and supplies for a full' Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAS)
.
Ultimately, plans call for the prepositioning of equipment
for two additional MA3s. [Ref. 45: p. 183]
The third and final concept for improving USCENTCOM's
viability and survivability is to continue to seek access,
not only in the area of operations, but also enroute to it.
This effort includes improving facilities at Diego Garcia,
Lajes Air Base in the Azores, and at various air facilities
in Morocco. [Ref. 45: p. 184] The political flexibility of
the host nations and the sensitivity of the access issue
makes these arrangements subject to day-to-day modification.
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B . SUMMARY
As it stands today, a greater U.S. access in Northeast
Africa is not feasible. U.S. policymakers have three basic
options or alternatives to access to consider:
1. Eliminate USCENTCOM and risk losing Western access
to Middle Eastern oil.
2. Modify the organization by reducing its size and
altering command and control apparatus. This option also
risks sending the signal to allies and potential adversaries
that the region and its resources are less important to the
U.S.
3. Maintaining USCENTCOM' s force structure as it is,
however continue to upgrade its strategic mobility, mean-
while continuing to attempt to gain access in countries near
the area of operations.
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VIII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has attempted to analyze the very complex and
politically sensitive issue of strategic access in Northeast
Africa. It should be apparent to the reader that USCENTCOM's
mission and organization requires a vast logistical system
in or near the potential target area from which it must
operate. VJithout this infrastructure, attained via access
or some other suitable means, USCENTCOM will not be able to
conduct sustained combat operations.
The four Northeast African nations addressed in this
study possess at least one or more strategic complexes which
would support USCENTCOM. Only six of the facilities are
actually of significant military value and are critical to
USCENTCOM planners.
Each of these four states also face major sources of
internal and external threat which potentially either en-
hance or inhibit the possiblity of attaining and maintaining
access agreements. These threats must be thoroughly con-
sidered by U.S. planners and these considerations must be
reflected by which types of assistance instruments are
provided in exchange for access.
Finally this study was designed to determine if a rela-
tionship exists between the situation on the ground within
these four states and the U.S.'s willingness to provide par-
ticular types of military and economic assistance instruments
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in order to gain access. To complete the task, the follow-
ing sections will assess each country individually reviewing
the critical factors which affect the access issue.
A. EGYPT
Egypt's strategic location and potentially valuable
military facilities at Ras-Banas make it critical for
USCENTCOM to acquire unconditional access in Egypt. More
importantly however is Egypt's continued role in and support
of the Camp David Accords. These two factors, coupled with
a shared concern for Soviet expansion places Egypt second
only to Israel in total U.S. military and economic
assistance.
Egypt's primary domestic concerns are economic in nature,
ESF assistance provided since 1979 indicates that the
American government shares this concern and is willing to
assist. [Ref. 46] Since 1979, following Camp David, the
U.S. has become almost the primary source of economic assis-
tance to Egypt. U.S. assistance is designed to promote eco-
nomic development, expand Egypt's infrastructure and reduce
its balance of payment problems. Grant assistance supports
both short and long term economic goals. Hosni Mubarak has
in recent years attempted to diversify Egypt's outside
sources of aid. He has renewed relations with Moscow and
continues to mend fences with the moderate Arab world in
hopes of creating greater regional stability.
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The U.S. continues to provide massive FMS credits to
Egypt for the purpose of modernizing its military. By pro-
viding this assistance the U.S. helps Egypt reduce sources
of internal threats from its military by providing modern
weapons systems, and sources of external threat by deterring
radical states in the region. This assistance is provided
on a "forgiven credit" basis in order to prevent further
growth of the Egyptian debt. (See Appendix F)
Does a relationship exist between the data in Appendix 6
and the degree of access achieved? In the author's opinion
it does not. In 1981 $525 million dollars was requested for
improvements of the facilities at Ras Eanas . None of that
allocation was ever expended. This year $49 million of the
$53 requested for military construction projects at Ras
Banas was approved, but only after Egypt agreed to grant
"unconditional" access to U.S. forces. [Ref. 47] To date
these conditions have not been met. Given the sensitivity
of the access issue within Egypt, it would appear that
these conditions will not be met in the immediate future.
This indicates that Egypt is far more concerned with the
more immediate threats, internal opposition and economic
underdevelopment than they are with external threats, (the
Soviets). Also, Mubarak fully recognizes Egypt's importance
to the U.S. in the Middle East peace process. He does not
believe that U.S. policymakers would jeopardize the Camp
David agreement in exchange for demands of unconditional
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military access. Washington and Cairo both want regional
stability, and U.S. military presence presently would be
counter productive to this stability. Thus, USCENTCON must
accept limited access to Egyptian facilities and American
military assistance must continue.
B. SUDAN
Sudan is also strategically important for the protection
of U.S. interest in the Middle East. Khartoum, in addition
to being the political and industrial hub of the nation,
also possesses key strategic air complexes which could be
used by USCENTCOM. Sudan's importance to the U.S. also
stems from its support of Egypt and the Camp David Accords.
This support has been a mixed blessing for the Sudan as will
be explained below.
President Numeri leads a country with several major prob-
lems which are primary sources of internal conflict. First
and foremost is the state of the economy. Relatively poor
in natural resources (except for potential oil exports) and
an increase in imports has created a rapidly growing national
debt in Sudan.
Prior to President Numeri' s recognition of Camp David the
moderate Arab world provided the majority of Sudan's economic
assistance. Now virtually cut off from this aid, Sudan has
turned to the West and the U.S. in particular for assistance.
The ESF program is the cornerstone of America's assistance to
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Sudan. (See Appendix G) This aid is designed to assist in
Sudan's development, support new and established agricultural
sectors, and meet short-term financial gaps. [Ref. 43:
p. 229]
Political instability stems from the regional fractional-
ism of the Arab north and Black Africa south. , American mili-
tary assistance can do little to reduce this source of
conflict. If anything, this schism has made Washington more
cautious in dealing with the Numeri regime. Only limited
types and quantities of military weapons have not been pro-
vided fearing that they may be used against internal fac-
tions, thus hurting future ties with the south in the event
of a coup. Primarily U.S. assistance has been designed
around economic endeavors, meanwhile reducing external
sources of threats from Libya and Ethiopia.
It is this instability that has caused concern for estab-
lishing long-term access agreements. Current U.S. policy
renders tacit support for the Numeri regime which may come
back to haunt the Reagan Administration. Numeri '
s
Islamization may be strengthening his position with the Arab
North, but it is doing little to reduce the opposition from
the South. Washington must tread lightly. Now is not the
time to seek and gain access agreements with Numeri '
s
government. This action would exacerbate Numeri' s internal
and external problems and possibly have very negative long-
term effects on U.S. strategy in the region.
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C. SOMALIA
Somalia by its geographic location alone is considered
critical to U.S. defense planners. In August 1980, Somalia
and the U.S. reached formal agreements granting access to
American military forces. [Ref. 35: p. b264] These facili-
ties at Berbera and Mogadishu are integral aspects to the
logistical and operational infrastructure required by
USCENTCOM.
President Siad Barre ' s regime is vulnerable to a number
of potential and real threats. Internally, his nation has
been ravaged by drought, the recession, a lack of natural
resources, and a huge budget deficit. This budget deficit
is clearly linked to some major fiscal and political mis-
takes made by Barre. Somalia's attack into Ethiopia in 1977
and their subsequent defeat in early 1978 left the Army
destroyed and the economy crushed. Worst of all, the major
objective of the attack, the unification of the Somali people
living in the Ogaden was not accomplished.
This action further destabilized the borders, which con-
tinue to be a source of external threat. Soviet bloc/
Ethiopian forces have continued to operate along the Somali
borders conducting various types of raids and air attacks.
The Barre regime is also threatened by the existence of the
Friendship Pact between Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen.
The net result of these threats is a weakened central govern-
ment with little means to create and sustain economic growth
or political stability.
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Current U.S. policy is aimed at maintaining access by
deterring external threats and meeting humanitarian needs.
Somalia's economy will not sustain full FMS credits, thus
U.S. assistance is primarily grants for economic development
and MAP funds for purchasing limited defensive arms. IMET
programs are important because they provide the U.S. with a
method of influencing the Somali military and upgrading of
Somalia's infrastructure. [Ref. 43: p. 295] (See
Appendix H)
If a relationship exists between access gained and mili-
tary assistance expended it is only marginal. USCENTCOM
needs and wants access in Somalia, but at what price? The
original agreement signed in 1980 has never been fully real-
ized much to Barre ' s chagrin. The bulk of $40 million as-
sistance package was for air defense weapons (Vulcans) , low
level radars, and construction services. To date none of
the ADA systems has been delivered and only partial up-
grading of the facilities at Berbera has been accomplished.
[Ref. 30: p. 57] if Somalia is so important to U.S. defense
planners why have the terms of the agreement not been met?
President Reagan' s Somali policy remains cautious. Several
reasons are apparent for this fact. First and foremost is
the instability of the Barre regime. The economic and po-
litical unrest makes Barre ' s position tenuous at best. The
U.S. has measured its support of Barre, yet has attempted to
meet the needs of the people while maintaining a low-level
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relationship. Secondly, and much less obvious, is
Washington's desire to ultimately reestablish relations with
Ethiopia. [Ref. 30: p. 58] In light of recent events in
Addis Ababa, particularly the declaration of the official
Communist Ethiopian Workers Party, this hope may not be
realistic. Thirdly,. the U.S. has always feared linking it-
self with Somali claims for a unified Somalia, and their
willingness to achieve this goal by force. Regional con-
flict is counter-productive to U.S. interests and Washington
does not want to be identified by the OAU as a supporter of
the Pan-Somalia movement.
Therefore, the U.S. will continue to deny Barre's re-
quest for offensive weapons, but will support the Somali
government with military and civilian equipment which en-
hances internal development. The 1980 access agreement will
remain on the back burner for now. USCENTCOM will continue
to plan for the use of Somali facilities but will not be
allowed to provide accelerated assistance to upgrade the
facilities at either Berbera or Mogadishu.
D . KENYA
Kenya, a long time American ally and supporter also en-
joys a critical strategic location for possible use by
USCENTCOM. Currently, U.S. military forces do have access
at Mombasa, the main port city, and at various airfields
throughout the country. U.S. policy is focused towards
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maintaining this access and the maintenance of regional
stability.
Historically, Kenya has been the hallmark of economic
and political stability in the region. However, in recent
years the economy has stagnated and this problem has been
exacerbated by a rapidly growing population. Politically
Kenya is a one-party state and exercises tight control over
various opposition groups. This tight control has led to
ever-growing internal pressures for political change. The
economic problems, coupled with the political unrest, have
created an atmosphere of instability uncommon to the Kenyan
people.
External threats are minimal but are a concern for
Kenyan and American planners. Somalia, because of its ir-
redentist activities, has always been considered an external
threat. The Kenyan leadership hopes that the American pres-
ence and pressures will deter any Somali military action.
To the South, the Kenyan borders with Uganda and Tanzania
have been a source of concern. Recent diplomatic efforts
hopefully have reduced, or at least minimized, this threat.
U.S. assistance programs for Kenya are targeted at help-
ing rejuvenate the economy and rebuilding its military
force. [Ref. 4 3: p. 261] Following the coup attempt in
1982 the Kenyan Air Force was disbanded. The current IMET
program is designed to improve the level of pilot training
and maintenance proficiency. Kenyan officials have adopted
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harsh economic austerity measures to assist in their own
economic recovery. U.S. ESF assistance will help to reduce
the budget deficit and reinvigorate Kenya's agricultural
sector. [Ref. 43: p. 262] (See Appendix I)
The relations between access achieved and assistance
expended may be the strongest in the Kenyan case. As indi-
cated by the figures in the appendices, Kenya has received
economic and military assistance from the U.S. at a rapidly
increasing rate. For example, requested MAP funds for
FY 1985 indicate almost a 300 percent increase from the
FY 1983 figures. The rate of increase for the other three
nations was quantitatively much less. However, Kenya's
facilities, because of their location, are the least desir-
able from a purely military perspective. Nevertheless,
traditional ties to the West make access more palatable to
the Kenya people.
But there are problems. The major problem comes from
the repressed, but still strong opposition movements led by
such men as Oginda Odinga. He has seriously opposed Kenya's
involvement in the East-West conflict. President Moi's ac-
cess agreement with the U.S., signed without parliamentary
discussion in 1981, has become a source of internal conflict.
[Ref. 32: p. 17] Moi is somewhat vulnerable but does not
appear to be in major danger. With that, the U.S. is more
willing to achieve the highest levels or degrees of access
in Kenya. Washington must continue to monitor the internal
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situation closely to ensure that access does not become a
greater source of instability.
E. CONCLUSION
Based on the current U.S. military force structure,
strategic access in Northeast Africa is a requirement for
the successful accomplishment of USCENTCOM 1 s mission. Ac-
cess will allow the logistical and operational activities
of USCENTCOM to function under various levels which are
critical to the organization. Six strategic complexes
exist in the region, located at Ras Banas , Berbera,
Mogadishu, Cairo, Mombasa and Khartoum, which facilitate and
enhance the USCENTCOM mission.
Within each country, a multiplicity of internal and ex-
ternal threats exist that ultimately affect the question of
U.S. access. The major conditions or factors in these four
countries which contribute to internal conflict and high
degrees of instability are economic difficulties and politi-
cal instability. Religious/ethnic factionalism, nationalism
or separatism, fear of domination by a superpower, and
social inequalities are other major sources of internal
strife in the region.
Soviet bloc or client intervention is the most common
source of external threat. Claiming a Soviet interventionist
threat has proven to have limited utility in the region.
U.S. assistance is often gained at the expense of increased
internal opposition within these countries. It is these
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sources of threats, or fears of their by-products, that have
created the parameters of U.S. assistance programs. U.S.
assistance programs are in most cases consistent with our
national goals and interests. The assistance instruments
used appear to be congruent with the needs of the states and
overall U.S. national objectives.
But a major dichotomy exists. USCENTCOM wants and needs
access rights in the region, to support the organization's
mission. However, it appears that instability within the
region is so intense that Washington is not willing to press
the access issue. Fears that increased U.S. pressures to
gain unconditional access to facilities in the region would
be counter-productive to regional stability. It would ap-
pear that Washington has applied some pragmatism to its
national strategy.
However, there is a price for this pragmatism. The U.S.
now has a military force designed and dedicated for the pur-
pose of projecting American military power into a politi-
cally volatile region, but without a means to support or
sustain it. It is not possible for American forces to oper-
ate in this area of the world without some type of opera-
tional and logistical support system.
If access is not politically feasible then alternatives
must be created. Three alternative options that could be
considered are: (1) eliminate USCENTCOM and/or its mission;
(2) scale down the size of the organization by making it
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a pure Navy-Marine Corps force; (3) maintain the present
structure, increasing the strategic mobility of the force,
meanwhile continuing to gain and utilize limited access to
facilities in or enroute to the area of operations. Ap-
parently the final option has been adopted by the current
administration.
F. NEXT STEPS
As indicated in this study, strategic access is a criti-
cal feature of current American defense policies. USCENTCOM
and other major U.S. commands must be able to match their
particular military needs with the political and economic
situations .within the potential host countries.
Future studies for USCENTCOM' s access requirements must
include similar analysis of states directly in the Persian
Gulf area of interest, (Oman and Saudi Arabia) , as well as
nations on the periphery. Madagascar is a good case in.
point. Although this island nation possesses one of the
best deep water ports in the Indian Ocean, their current
ideological position makes U.S. access impossible.
Finally, a similar analysis should be accomplished for
access to Israeli facilities. A greater U.S. presence may
be welcomed by Jerusalem, but what would be the implications
and responses from the Arab capitals? These types of ques-




FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985
(Actual) (Estimated) (Proposed)
EGYPT $750 Mil. $750 Mil.* $750 Mil.
SUDAN $82.25 Mil.** $120 Mil.** $120 Mil.**
SOMALIA $35 Mil.** $35 Mil.** $35 Mil.**
KENYA $30 Mil.** $40 Mil.** $55 Mil.**
*The amount for Egypt reflects $103.06 Million deobli-
gated from the actual FY 1983 budget and $14.9 Million
from the estimated FY 1984 budget request ($118 Million
total) that was carried forward into FY 1984 figures.
**Reflects grant aid funds
Source: Congressional Presentation, Security
Assistance Programs for FY 1985, and Foreign Military
Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military




U.S. FMS AGREEMENTS VS DELIVERIES








Figures are in constant 1977 dollars
Source: The Reluctant Supplies: U.S. Decisionmaking
for Arms Sales, pages 129 and 131.
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**$550 Million was unexpended from the FY 1983
authorization.
Source: Congressional Presentation, Security

























Source: Congressional Presentation, Security
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P.L. 480 $266.8 Mil.

















Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assis-
tance Program, FY 1985, p. 117.
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APPENDIX G
SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN
FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985
(Actual) (Estimated) (Proposed)
FMS $ -0- $ -0- $ -0-
FOREIGN
MILITARY
AND $31 Mil. $60 Mil. $60 Mil.
CONSTRUCTION
SALES*
ESF $82.25 Mil. $120 Mil. $120 Mil.
MAP $43 Mil. $45 Mil. $69 Mil.
IMET $1.3 Mil $1.5 Mil. $1.7 Mil.
OTHERS
DEVELPMENT
AID $28.5 Mil. $22.7 Mil. $28 Mil.
PL 480 $51 Mil. $51.7 Mil. $52.45 Mil
Subtotal of FMS Program,
Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assis-
tance Programs, FY 1985, p. 301.
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APPENDIX H
SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA
FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985
(Actual) (Estimated) (Proposed)
FMS $10 Mil. $ -0- $ -0-
FOREIGN
MILITARY
AND $8.5 Mil $30 Mil. $30 Mil.
CONSTRUCTION
SALES*
ESF $21 Mil. $35 Mil. $35 Mil.
MAP $15 Mil. $32 Mil. $40 Mil.
IMET $601,000 $1 Mil. $1.25 Mil
OTHERS
DEVELOPMENT
AID $14.9 Mil. $17.7 Mil. $22 Mil.
PL 480 $21.8 Mil. $24.1 Mil. $21.8 Mil
*Subtotal of FMS Program
Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assis-
tance Programs, FY 1985.
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APPENDIX I
SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO KENYA
FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985
(Actual) (Estimated) (Proposed)
FMS - $10 Mil. $10 Mil. $ -0-
FOREIGN
MILITARY
AND $16.6 Mil. $35 Mil. $20 Mil.
CONSTRUCTION
SALES*
ESF $30 Mil. $40 Mil. $55 Mil.
MAP $8.5 Mil. $12 Mil. $23 Mil.
IMET $1.4 Mil. $1.5 Mil. $1.8 Mil.
OTHER
DEVELOPMENT
AID $30.6 Mil. $34.7 Mil. $3 Mil.
PL 480 $17.64 Mil. $9.9 Mil. $15.14 Mil
*Subtotal of FMS Programs
Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assis-
tance Programs, FY 1985, p. 263.
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